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Abstract 
This paper analyses the influence of perceived violence on livelihood decision-
making of indigenous households in post-conflict Chittagong Hill Tracts of 
Bangladesh following a formal peace treaty in 1997. The study results suggest 
that households perceiving high risk of violence spend less on consumption 
expenditure and are sending children to school more, cultivating more land 
and engaged more in producing mixed subsistence and cash crops. Using both 
quantitative and qualitative data this study finds decreasing emphasis on 
present consumption, long term investment in human capital, using land more 
intensively to earn more cash and move towards creating surplus instead of 
producing for subsistence, which suggests perceived violence is producing 
decisions which are similar to those advocated in a classical ‘modernization 
process’. Findings of this paper are similar to the argument of ‘post traumatic 
growth theory’ and indicates a post-conflict ‘phoenix’ factor may be in 
operation at the household level in which some income raising livelihood 
decisions are made as a consequence of fear of renewed violence. In the short 
run, the ‘phoenix’ factor appears to operate through both increased land use 
and cash crop cultivation and in the long run through increased human capital. 
Keywords 
Post-conflict, perception of violence, livelihood decisions, land use, schooling 
 8
Incorporating perceptions and experiences of violence 
into livelihood decision-making1 
a micro level study in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of 
Bangladesh 
1 Introduction 
The possibility of recurrence of conflict justifies household-level perceptions 
of threats of violence in the post-war period. Perceptions of threats of violence 
may influence decision-making by households since perceptions of violence 
undermine both micro and macro level security for both households and their 
wider community. Micro level studies in other locations have explored the case 
that war influences economic behaviour either directly by individuals or 
through collective actions. Empirical evidence has revealed that influences of 
war on individual economic responses can be either positive or negative. 
Experience of post war economic performance varies between contexts. 
Negative impact of civil war on economic growth is quite obvious through 
destroyed infrastructure and reduced human capital formation. Post war 
positive economic performance is explained by ‘Post-traumatic growth theory’ 
and suggests that a ‘Phoenix Factor’ exists. Tedeschi & Calhaoun (1996), 
Bellows & Miguel (2009), Blattman (2008), Voors & Bulte (2008), Powell et al. 
(1993) and Nillesen & Verwimp (2010) provide empirical evidence of positive 
economic performance in post war periods (Nillesen & Verwimp 2010 and 
Koubi, 2005). 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), a region of Bangladesh historically 
inhabited by non-Bengali speaking indigenous people came into armed conflict 
with the Bangladeshi State2 due to a number of reasons; namely demand for 
regional autonomy, ethnic recognition in the Constitution by the State, 
withdrawal of both transmigrated people (commonly referred as ‘Settlers’ by 
state-sponsored settlement programme from other parts of Bangladesh) and 
the army. A two decade long armed conflict between the ethnic rebels (Parbatya 
Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti-PCJSS) and the State formally came to an end by 
signing ‘CHT Peace Accord’ in 1997. Formal end of armed conflict through 
surrender of the military wing of PCJSS is considered as the most vital success 
of the ‘Peace Accord’. However, pessimism regarding the full implementation 
of the ‘Peace Accord’ is the major underlying grievance factor and complaints 
underlying this conflict (e.g. land dispute) have not yet been addressed (Adnan, 
2004 and Mohsin, 2003).  
                                                 
1 I am thankful to Prof. Syed Mansoob Murhsed and Dr. John Cameron for their 
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I wish to acknowledge the 
financial contribution of Nuffic for enabling this study at ISS.   
2 The conflict in the CHT of Bangladesh is internationally designated as ‘Minor armed 
conflict’ as per intensity and categorized as ‘Internationalized internal armed conflict 
occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition 
group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. 
For detail see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-
Conflicts-Version-X-2009/ (accessed on November 05, 2010). 
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Several studies show that successful implementation of a peace treaty is a 
challenging issue. Murshed (2010a) found that after the Cold War (between 
1991 and 2005), 148 peace settlements have been signed and about 70% (104) 
of these treaties appear to have been implemented successfully.  The other 44 
treaties (30%) are reported to have failed. Even treaties appearing to be 
implemented required several rounds of negotiations and involved risks of 
reneging by some groups. There is an absence of knowledge about the 
incomplete peace process and its impact on changing livelihoods after the 
signing of the peace accord. This paper aims to investigate the relationship 
between threat perceptions of violence as a proxy of experiences of violence 
and indigenous peoples’ livelihood decision-making processes in the post-
conflict3 situation in the CHT.  
Post-conflict societies usually experience two distinct types of challenges - 
economic recovery and reduction of risk of recurrence of conflict. Post-
conflict societies are likely to revert to conflict within a decade in a typical low-
income country (Collier et al. 2008). Successful implementation of a peace 
accord requires continuous efforts that are not present in the CHT. Conflict 
between the State and the indigenous people of CHT took place in the land-
hungry context of the most densely populated, large population country in the 
world, which is also a low-income developing nation where agriculture 
continues to be the main source of the population’s livelihoods. Thus, neo-
Malthusian factors may be at work in Bangladesh. Population growth adds to 
land scarcity, which can be further exacerbated by environmental degradation, 
and can fuel conflict driven by greed/need for ever scarcer land and 
environmental resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999). It is often difficult to reach a 
solution to land disputes, and it is especially complex and challenging in 
Bangladesh where various types of negative economic and political experiences 
are associated with land holding disputes (for details see Barkat & Roy 2008 
and Barkat & Huda 1988).    
Peace building process gained an additional complex dimension following 
the Accord with non-recognition of  the ‘Peace Accord’ by one section of 
indigenous peoples and consequently this group’s mobilization for a different 
political front, ‘United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF)’ to continue the 
struggle for full autonomy (Mohsin 2003).  Continuing land disputes, non-
withdrawal of army, poor rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDP) along with opposition to the Peace Accord make the post 
conflict situation of CHT more vulnerable. As a consequence, indigenous 
population living in this area have been experiencing various types of violence, 
misrecognition and mistrust from settlers. These are manifested through 
continuing acts of low intensity violence like arson, abduction, extortions, 
insecurity of women and children, low intensity armed conflict, and restricted 
mobility, but overall it does seem acceptable to see the situation as being post-
conflict with fear of future violence being a stronger influence than present 
actual experiences (Barkat et al. 2009).  
                                                 
3 It is difficult to find true ‘post-conflict’ situation as conflict can be more or less 
violent, more or less manifest or latent but rarely stop altogether. Here post-conflict is 
referred as residual of formal armed conflict, where open armed conflict has come to 
an end through a peace accord (Junne and Verkoren 2005). 
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The analysis of shock of civil war is a new phenomenon in the literature 
on livelihoods’ impacts of shocks, the common feature of these studies is 
inclusion of actual violence exposure during war and post war. As an extension 
to this literature, this study intends to estimate influences of perceived threats 
of violence in a post-conflict situation on livelihood decision-making by 
indigenous households of CHT.  
1.1 Research questions 
The key objective of this paper is to understand the micro-level foundations of 
household decision-making by indigenous people living in the post conflict 
CHT. This research is designed to examine the relationship of household 
livelihood responses to different levels of perceived threat of violence in a 
post-conflict situation. The main research question is to answer how 
indigenous households are adapting their livelihoods in the formal post-
conflict situation of CHT. 
More specific research questions are as follows; 
1. Whether different perceived threats of violence influence households’ 
livelihood decision-making in the current post-conflict situation? 
2. What are the motivational factors functioning behind the influence of 
perceived threat of violence on households’ livelihood decision-making? 
1.2 Justification and relevance 
There is a dearth of empirical evidence regarding economic performance of 
households in response to differing perceived threats of violence in the post-
conflict literature (Verwimp, Justino and Brück, 2009). This study aims to 
contribute to the recent academic literature by analysing influences of shocks 
caused by perceived threat of violence on the basis of post-conflict data on 
violence and livelihood decision-making. This has similarities to the findings of 
Nillesen and Verwimp (2010) in the context of rural Burundi, where conflict 
can result in the increased production of cash and export crops for the market 
displacing subsistence cultivation. 
Influence of perceived threats of violence is worth investigating since the 
perception of violence may be more influential on development because 
perceptions of violence may be more frequent than violence that is actually 
experienced and this can have a significant widespread impact on household 
decision-making (Rizal and Yokota 2006). 
Generally in the conflict literature, households are considered to be 
passive victims of violence. In this study, households are assumed to be active 
rational agents taking various livelihood decisions in response to differential 
perceived threats of violence. This will add to the existing literature on impacts 
of violence on development.  
The knowledge to be gained from the analysis of influence of perceived 
threat of violence on households’ livelihood decision-making may help to 
understand that the impact of threat of violence as a shock is different from 
weather-related shocks, illness, development interventions and other influential 
factors affecting poverty over time. 
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The methodology used in this research combines quantitative data 
collected in a large questionnaire survey with qualitative insights from focus 
group interviews. Finally, this study is an experiment in the literature of 
empirical livelihood analysis as it incorporates threat of violence as a 
component in the orthodox sustainable livelihood framework.  
1.3 Background and context of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
conflict 
Bangladesh is the one of the most densely populated (1,229 people/sq.km) 
countries in the world where the amount of arable land was only 0.1 hectare 
per capita in 2007. It is a low income developing country with about 50% of 
the population (using the international poverty line of below $1.25 per capita 
per day) living in poverty (World Bank; 2010). Over last two decades, 
Bangladesh’s economy experienced real growth rates of around 5.5% per 
annum, but still a large part of GDP emanates from subsistence agriculture 
(World Development Indicators). A few ethnic communities with different 
languages and religions from the Bengali speaking, Muslim are concentrated in 
the CHT region (Roy, 2000). 
This section will document a brief profile of the CHT and its people with 
distinguishing between the indigenous population and the Bengali speaking 
majority population of Bangladesh. The shared ‘identity’ of a self-identified 
group of people is important in other studies of violence and development 
nexus as it assumed to reduce the costs of collective action on shared 
grievances (Murshed, 2010b).  
In CHT land grabbing and dispossession is the central issue of conflict 
between indigenous and inmigrant Bengali speaking communities (Chakma, 
2006). Two districts of this region are recognized as the most backward 
districts in Bangladesh in terms of conventional development indicators 
(Unicef 2010). The proportion of non-indigenous population (Bengali 
speaking) in CHT has been increasing over time. As per 1991 population 
census of Bangladesh, indigenous population constitutes 51.4% of the CHT 
total population of about one million (Adnan 2004, Mohsin 2003 and Roy 
2000). 
The CHT occupies one-tenth (13,189 sq.km) of the total territory of 
Bangladesh and is mostly mountainous and therefore suitable for guerrilla 
warfare. This region is situated in the southeastern part of Bangladesh and is 
covered with lush green hills, innumerable jharnas (scattered springs) and 
hundreds of choras (mountain streamlets). The area is divided into three 
administrative districts; Bandarban, Khagrachari and Rangamati. From 
economic and strategic point of view CHT is important for national policy 
makers. It is adjacent to two Indian states Tripura on the north and Mizoram 
on the east and by Myanmar on the south and east. Insurgency in the Indian 
north-east states and Myanmar raises the military importance of this region 
(Barkat et al. 2009 and Mohsin 2003).  
The CHT region enjoyed its autonomous status (largely a self-governed 
independent territory) until 1860 when the British took it over as their vassal. 
‘Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900’ declared CHT as an 'Exclusive 
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Area' and put an embargo on ‘outsiders’ (people other than indigenous ones) 
to settle or purchase land in this territory. Under this act people of this region 
enjoyed substantive autonomy until 1962 when the ‘excluded area’ status of 
CHT was replaced with that of a ‘tribal area’ through constitutional 
amendment. This amendment was aimed at paving the way for an influx of 
non-indigenous people into the region in large numbers. Consequently the 
indigenous leadership (Raja, Headman, Karbari) lost control over land 
allocation. 
A pluralistic legal and judicial system now prevails. Legal pluralism is 
evident in application of customary, regional, and national laws to the region. 
Judicial pluralism is reflected through the co-existence of traditional and state 
courts and functioning of traditional institutions in the land revenue 
management of this region. Property rights in the CHT are not well defined 
and complex, for land in particular (Barkat et al. 2009, and Roy, 2000).  
According to population censuses of Bangladesh there are eleven ethnic 
groups Bawm, Chak, Chakma, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Marma, Mro, 
Pangkhua, Tanchangya, and Tripura. Their appearance, languages, and cultural 
traditions are significantly different from the Bengali speaking majority 
population of Bangladesh. They are closer in appearance and culture to their 
neighbours in north-eastern India, Myanmar and Thailand. Buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Christianity all are practiced in CHT. They have their own 
language in both oral and written form though many of the scripts are under 
threat. The indigenous population of CHT is often identified as Jumma people 
as it is derived from the word jum (swidden cultivation) which served as the 
corner stone in the life of the indigenous people. They are officially recognized 
as ‘Hillmen’, ‘Tribal’, or ‘Jumiya’ (Swidden cultivator)4.  
Land is the key factor of production in the CHT economy. The relation of 
indigenous people to land is deeply rooted. Traditionally, almost all the 
communities were engaged in subsistence jum or swidden cultivation (also 
referred as slash and burn or shifting cultivation). Besides jum cultivation, there 
exists small scale plough cultivation as well. The indigenous peoples were also 
enjoying self sufficiency in terms of food production in earlier times despite 
only 23% of the land being arable (Adnan 2004, Barkat et al. 2009 and Roy 
2000).  
The land ownership patterns as well as types of land in CHT differ from that 
of plain regions. Customary ownership of land exists here. Also about one-
fourth of the total CHT land is occupied by reserve forest which restricts 
cultivation and extraction by indigenous people. Indigenous people are 
permitted to use the rest of the land recognized as Unclassified State Forest 
(USF) in addition to the ‘District Forest (DF)’ under the discretion of the 
administration. Due to the construction of an artificial reservoir by damming 
the river Karnafuli at Kaptai in the 1960s, approximately 1,036 square 
kilometres were submerged including the main urban centre of CHT and 
                                                 
4 In this study the term ‘indigenous’ is used to indicate the tribal and/or ethnic 
population of CHT without reference to the debate on the indigenous status in official 
documents of Bangladesh. For detail about the debate on recognition of indigenous 
status of this tribal population, see Ahmed (2010). 
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54,000 acres of highly prized cultivable lands in the river valleys. The loss of 
productive lands, along with displacement and uprooting of people, increased 
demographic and economic pressure leading to impoverishment and insecurity 
which gave rise to resentment among the indigenous people against the State 
and motivated them in their struggles in the following periods. Finally, state 
sponsored migration program settled about 400,000 landless Bengali in the 
CHT during 1979-1986. It led to dispossession of thousands of acres of lands 
claimed by indigenous people (Adnan 2004, Barkat et al. 2009 and Roy 2000).  
MAP 1 
 Chittagong Hill Tracts in map of Bangladesh (shaded area) 
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During the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971, some indigenous leaders 
in were not in favour of Bengali nationalism which gave a basis for long lasting 
mistrust between the then national politicians and the indigenous peoples.  
Soon after independence of Bangladesh, a delegation of the CHT people led by 
M. N. Larma, member of the Constituent Assembly and a veteran fighter in 
the Liberation War, submitted a memorandum to the government of 
Bangladesh demanding constitutional recognition of the indigenous 
communities living in the CHT and regional autonomy for protection of their 
distinct ethnic and cultural identity. However, neither the recognition of the 
communities nor regional autonomy received constitutional recognition in 
Bangladesh (Adnan 2004 and Barkat et al. 2009). 
Due to lack of understanding of the gravity of CHT problem, successive 
governments undertook a number of strategies including military solution and 
state sponsored population transfer programmes. A huge amount of financial 
allocation was made to make these programs successful. In 1976 armed forces 
were also deployed in ‘Aid to Civil Power’ which triggered tension in the 
region. A few indigenous political groups (e.g., PCJSS) undertook the policy of 
armed struggle against the authorities. Under the counter insurgency strategy, 
demographic engineering interventions aimed at settling a large number of 
Bengali speaking households in CHT were undertaken to enhance the size of 
population loyal to the state, and these fresh settlements would act as a 
counterweight to the population demanding indigenous peoples’ rights and 
regional autonomy. However in the subsequent period, government tried to 
find a political solution to the problem (Adnan 2004 and Barkat et al. 2009). 
1.4 Organization of this paper 
This paper is organised in a logical sequence in line with the research objectives 
and questions. This paper comprises five chapters where the first chapter has 
commenced with an introduction along with research questions, and 
justification of this research, and the background and context of CHT. The 
second chapter deals with theoretical and analytical approach of the study. 
Epistemology, methodological issues and data used in this research are 
discussed in chapter three. Study findings on the influence of perceived threat 
of violence on households’ livelihood decision-making are documented in 
chapter four. Finally, the concluding chapter (chapter five) focuses on the 
contribution of the study in the broad academic literature besides the key 
findings. In addition, two appendixes provide data tables, and data collection 
tools. 
2   Theoretical and analytical approach 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a brief discussion on the theoretical and analytical 
approach followed in this study. The chapter has been structured on the basis 
of literature review of some specific issues like post conflict economic 
performance, causes of conflict and violence, and individual decision-making 
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under uncertainty. This chapter aims to provide a brief discussion on the 
theoretical and analytical approach followed in this study. The chapter has 
been structured on the basis of literature review of some specific issues like 
post conflict economic performance, causes of conflict and violence, and 
individual decision-making under uncertainty. The empirical approach is based 
on the sustainable livelihoods framework. 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Post civil war economic performance 
It is widely believed that civil wars in developing countries retard progress, and 
help to perpetuate poverty. Indeed there is a vicious cycle linking the risk of 
conflict to poverty. Civil war and its aftermath impact economic performance 
at both the macro and micro level. Empirical studies on the relationship 
between civil war and subsequent economic growth demonstrate three 
different scenarios where either positive or negative and even no relation can 
exist. Several studies found that civil war has widespread negative effects on 
subsequent economic performance. The obvious immediate negative impacts 
of civil war include destruction of human and physical capital through killing, 
destruction of physical infrastructure, and dispossession of assets. The post-
war estimated effects of civil war violence are substantial through reduced 
human capital formation, increased health problems, displacement of 
population, and impediment of economic sector development (Nellison and 
Verwimp, 2010 and Koubi, 2005). Hoeffler and Reynal-Querrol (2003) 
estimates that involvement in civil war for five years can reduce economic 
growth rate by not less than 2 percent annually. 
Other studies on implication of civil war also provide evidence that civil 
war has a disastrous or growth retarding effect. Murshed (2010a) discusses the 
impact of civil war on economic growth and cited Murdoch and Sandler’s 
study (2004) which finds that civil war at home can reduce economic growth of 
a country by 31% in the long run and this adverse effect can increase to 85% in 
the short run. They also show that countries adjacent to civil war are also 
adversely affected. Combined inter-state war and civil war affects growth 
adversely in general (Koubi 2005).   
But several studies on the consequences of war for economic growth in a 
large cross-section of countries found that the overall relationship (non-causal) 
between war and economic growth is negative but the causal effect of civil war 
(considering different characteristics of war) shows positive impact on post 
war (subsequent) economic performance. Organski and Kugler (1977, 1980) 
focused on the fact that nations that suffered serious damage to their industrial 
capacity during the war rebuild afterwards. Such reconstruction and rebuilding 
productive capacity requires a higher level of investment compared to pre war 
period which by itself raises the growth rate of output. Nations can get the 
opportunity to rebuild a more technologically advanced basis for the economy. 
Their arguments are similar to the argument for a ‘Phoenix Factor’. They also 
found a differential impact of war on growth for both parties of a war; winners 
and losers. They argued that the losers are more likely to have a larger phoenix 
factor than war winners and therefore it grows faster since they may have 
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suffered the larger destruction. Similar results are presented by Collier (1999) 
where he conditions various war characteristics on economic growth and it is 
revealed that prolonged war has significant positive association with higher 
growth. 
However, alongside claims for both positive and negative impacts of civil 
war on post war economic growth, other studies also revealed an ambiguous 
relationship. Barro and Lee (1994) studied the determinants of economic 
growth in a large cross section of country for a period of 1965 to 1985 and 
they found that the estimated coefficient for war effects is insignificant on 
economic growth. But they acknowledge the poor quality of data rather than 
importance of war is responsible for getting such results. Moreover there is a 
huge problem of reverse causality in this type of estimation. 
According to ‘post-traumatic growth theory’, people experiencing violence 
can have positive responses to trauma and be successful in transforming 
negative events into something positive at both individual and community 
levels. Empirical evidence from Sierra Leone and Uganda shows that 
participation in politics and community affairs and contributions to local public 
goods are higher among war victims than non-victims. In Sarajevo it is found 
that war victims were experiencing more personal income growth than others. 
A recent study finds that in rural Burundi farmers who were exposed to civil 
war violence increase exports, cultivation of cash crops, investment in public 
goods and reveal higher levels of subjective welfare evaluations. However, 
several studies also found that rural households return to subsistence 
agriculture as a response to risk of potential shock and move away from more 
risky activities (Nillesen and Verwimp, 2010).  
 
2.2.2 Causes of violent-conflict 
This paper aims to analyse influence of post-conflict perceptions of potential 
violence on livelihood decision-making. But, to understand the context of the 
post-conflict period, it is necessary to discuss briefly the causes of conflict.  
Recent studies on causes of internal violent conflict or civil war finds a 
wide variety of factors which may be broadly categorised as greed and grievance. 
The term greed indicates acquisitive activities similar to crime or in other words 
it is a disguised form of political grievance while the term grievance refers to a 
sense of injustice experienced by a well-defined social group (language, 
ethnicity, religion and colour) with a historical dimension.  
Murshed (2010a) discussed the influential work of Paul Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002, 2004) where greed is considered as a prime cause of conflict. 
Greed as a motive for conflict has mainly arisen in the context of abundance of 
mineral resource endowment which increases the risk of experiencing conflict. 
It suggests that conflict reflects elite competition over valuable natural 
resources like diamond, and oil. Organizing an insurgency against the 
government originates from the greedy behaviour of a rebel group. In the 
context of CHT, this greed factor is not relevant to analyse the causes of 
conflict as there is no conflict due to any valuable minerals exploitation by the 
State or the rebel groups.  
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Grievance is another central concept within the conflict discourse. It points 
to a motivation driven by a search for justice. Relative deprivation, polarization 
and horizontal inequality are three major driving forces in theories of grievances. 
Ted Gurr (1970) defined relative deprivation as the discrepancy between 
aspirations and achievements (discussed in Murshed 2010a).  
Polarization is another crucial concept where two or more groups exhibit 
great inter-group heterogeneity and intra-group homogeneity. Polarization can 
be economic, ethnic or both. Strong feelings of identity plus alienation can 
explain polarization. Murshed (2010a) cited Montalova and Reynal-Querol 
(2005; 2007) in claiming that polarization is functional for explaining both 
incidence and duration of civil war. Indigenous community and Bengali 
speaking settler communities are polarized ethnically (Adnan, 2004 and Roy 
2002). The notion of horizontal inequalities was proposed by Frances Stewart 
(2000) and is seen as an important cause of contemporary civil war. It focuses 
on measuring inequality between groups based on an ethnic group identity 
(Murshed 2010a).  
Bringing these causes together, it can be argued that identity is influential 
in shaping conflict as it reduces cost of collective actions (e.g. group formation 
for violence). An ethnic dimension is a common feature of most contemporary 
civil wars in developing countries where well-defined and ethnically distinct 
groups fight one another. Organized group conflict can happen in a situation 
where individual and group grievances merge because of easier collective 
action. In general, group grievances are often associated with historical 
injustices and may be also related to immediate inequalities and inequalities of 
opportunities. For instance, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, one of the highest 
intensity internal conflicts in recent times, has been claimed to be motivated by 
horizontal inequality (high Gini Index and Polarization index scores) with a 
spatial dimension meaning the most disadvantaged areas faced most intense 
conflict (Murshed and Gates 2005:121-122, and Murshed 2010a).    
Growth failure and economic mismanagement can enhance civil war risk. 
It is also true that successful economic growth can also increase the violence 
propensity amongst those who are left behind. Estimates show a non-linear 
relationship (inverted-U-shaped) between violence and development in terms 
of income and education (Tadjoeddin and Murshed, 2007). Both economic 
growth and contraction can produce instability and violence as argued by 
Olson (1963). An inverted-U-shape relationship between economic prosperity 
and level of violence was established by Bates (2001). He argued with historical 
evidence that violence and increasing prosperity go hand in hand at initial stage 
but decline afterwards.   
Incentives that shape interaction between two distinct social groups 
determine the nature of social capital in conflict prone circumstances. Social 
capital between two distinct social groups has a crucial functional role in either 
creating or stopping violence. A study on communal riots between Hindus and 
Muslims in India found that a sustained legacy of religious tolerance resulted 
from the differences in the degree to which medieval Hindus and Muslims 
could provide complementary, non-replicable services and a mechanism to 
share the gain from exchange. Muslims had advantages in Indian Ocean 
shipping, high incentives for trading across ethnic lines in medieval trading 
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ports leading to develop an institutional mechanism that further supported 
inter-religious exchange. This study found that medieval trading ports are 25% 
less likely to experience a religious riot between 1850-1950 and these medieval 
trading ports are continuing to exhibit less widespread religious violence during 
the Gujarat riots in 2002. The interpretation of these differences is the 
persistence of institutions (social capital) that emerged to support inter-
religious medieval trade (Jha, 2008). 
In CHT, the indigenous population of CHT is the poorest, relatively 
deprived segment of Bangladesh as well as having substantial polarising social 
differences from the majority population of Bangladesh (Barkat et al. 2009 and 
Adnan 2004). Indigenous people also have a grievance of justice from the State 
as they claim that to be the owners of the land historically and the State 
grabbed their land for settling Bengali speaking population of other parts of 
Bangladesh (Adnan, 2004 and Roy 2002).  
In the CHT context, it seems that land grabbing (due to settlement of 
Bengali speaking inmigrant, accusation of land under forest department and 
military base) is motivated by a sense of a need rather than a greed factor. This is 
closer to the argument of Homar-Dixon type neo-Malthusian explanation 
where competition for land, water and other inputs has been increasing day by 
day due to increased number of population without access to modern sector 
employment. 
2.3 Theoretical tools: integrated livelihood decision-making 
under uncertainty 
Micro level studies of conflict focus on ‘individual’ decision making processes 
where decisions are considered as outcomes of reflections on individual 
experiences plus interactions between individual agents conscious of differing 
private interests. In real life experience, individuals usually have to take these 
decisions under conditions of risk and uncertainty. In this situation, an 
individual has to take a decision from a set of alternatives where each 
alternative may result in an uncertain outcome. Under such uncertainty, the 
individual decision maker is expected to have a rational preference relation 
over the set of uncertain outcomes. Expected utility is one model to explain 
individual choice under risk (Mas-Collel et al. 1995). However applicability of 
this probability approach of risk is criticised by Shackle (1958) as it is 
applicable only to replicable experiments. He argued that if a decision is non-
repeatable, probability or expected utility theory cannot be applied. He noted 
that mathematical expectation calculations actually ignore uncertainty. Another 
crucial argument against expected utility theory is the notion of importance of 
safety perceived by individuals. Decisions may be more concerned with the 
most disastrous situation rather than a marginal increase in gain or satisfaction. 
For many people it is arguably more preferred to reduce the chance of the 
occurrence of a catastrophe (Roy, 1952). Generally individuals may be loss 
averse in a wide variety of domains of uncertainty; people may be more averse 
to losses than attracted to the same financial amount of gain. 
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Additionally, most households in developing countries usually take 
simultaneous livelihood decisions about production (output level, demand for 
factors of production, and the choice of technology) and consumption (labour 
supply and commodity demand). The complex mixture of the economics of 
the firm and the households is a salient feature of the situation of most 
households in the developing countries, particularly in contexts of widespread 
small scale farming. An Agricultural Household Model (AHM) can be used to 
ex-plain such decision making processes where households engage in 
production and consumption at the same time. 
In a simple rural economy, households have EA amount of land and Lm & 
Lf amount of labour where Lm and Lf  stands for amount of labour used for 
wage earning (wM) and own production respectively. Since M means the 
maximum amount of labour a households can sell; thus Lm cannot be greater 
than M (Lm≤M). Households will maximize its utility;  
 
Max U (c,l); c,l≥ 0 
 
Subject to c= F(EL-M-l, EA) + wM,  
where EL = Total amount of labour hour  
l = amount of leisure and  
c= amount of consumption. 
 
Under this condition if households maximize utility at the point where house-
hold works M+ Lf hours and consumes c= wM+F(Lf, EA). Now it becomes 
clear that a household’s production choices depend on its preference and 
endowment (Bardhan and Udry 1999). 
This theoretical rational choice approach, household decision making 
processes and/or livelihood responses will be empirically developed within the 
sustainable livelihoods framework developed by Michael Scott and Diana 
Carney and used by DFID (Solesbury 2003:10-11). The original framework is a 
bit modified by incorporating violence and threat of violence and its associated 
uncertainty in the framework. Experience of violence and threat of uncertain 
conflict is considered as a shock which creates a vulnerability context for 
households in the orthodox livelihood framework which may be different from 
the more usual vulnerability contexts of weather related shocks and ill-health. 
 20
Livelihood 
Outcomes 
 
Livelihood Assets
Vulnerability 
Context, 
including 
perceptions 
of threats of 
violence 
H 
N  
Livelihood 
strategies 
 
 
Transforming 
structures &
processes 
(in the 
presence of 
violence) 
Influence  
and Access 
P 
F  S 
FIGURE 2.1 
 Sustainable livelihood framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted form Solesbury, 2003 
 
3   Research epistemology, methodology and data sources 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides discussion on how this paper acquired answers to the 
research questions. It gives a picture of the epistemological assumptions, 
methods used and data sources. It has a special focus on the strengths and 
weaknesses, including reflexivity, challenges of the quantitative and qualitative 
data collected and used for analysis. A brief discussion on analytical tools used 
for analyzing quantitative data is made here. Finally, it also documents the 
limitations of the study data. 
3.2 Epistemology 
The primary focus of this study is to analyze household livelihood decision-
making under perceived threats of violence within a constrained rational choice 
framework. Theoretical and analytical approach used in this study shows that 
this paper is strongly influenced by ‘positivist’ epistemology. This epistemology 
advocates the application of methods of natural sciences to the study of social 
phenomena (Grix, 2004). Positivist epistemology claims to observe ‘truths’ in 
an objective and independent way by the researcher without having been 
influenced by the re-searcher’s values and assumptions. This resembles the 
scientific search for ‘truth’ through an objective procedure as in physics. This 
positivist epistemology is very compatible with quantitative data analysed using 
econometric statistical techniques. Such an objective positionality is claimed in 
neo-classical economics, such as when Friedman (1953) wrote “Positive 
Key:
H- Human capital
N- Natural capital
F- Financial capital
S- Social capital
P- Physical capital 
 21
economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or 
normative judgements. It provides a system of generalizations that can be used 
to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in the 
circumstances.” 
Positivist epistemology asserts the possibilities of unbounded inquiry and 
possibility of knowing natural laws without taboos or references to any 
supreme authority in the natural world. There is no scope for influence of 
values and assumptions of researcher in this study beyond the rational choice 
theoretical approach and sustainable livelihood framework. In line with this 
epistemology, regression exercises on the relationships between perceived 
threats of violence and livelihood decision-making are used. The validity of 
logical induction combined with regression techniques and an unbiased sample 
is not beyond question. Popper (1972) rightly recognised this problem which is 
evident in his work “According to my reformulation, the central issue of the 
logical problem of induction is the validity (truth or falsity) of universal laws 
relative to some ‘given’ statements.”  But for the purposes of this research, a 
positivist epistemology will be adopted. 
3.3 Methodology 
This research aims to analyse the influence of perceived threat of violence on 
livelihood decision-making quantitatively along with in-depth qualitative 
interpretation. Therefore both quantitative and qualitative approaches have 
been chosen to address the research questions. In the quantitative approach 
both descriptive and analytical statistics will be used using a cross sectional 
dataset from a questionnaire survey at household level. Under qualitative 
approach, applied group data collection techniques were used such as Focus 
Group Discussion (FGD) and Transect Walk type of a participative approach 
(PRA). In addition, Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Direct Observation 
techniques offer in-depth and meaningful explanations of people’s decisions 
and behaviour. 
The quantitative analysis of influence of perceived threat of violence on 
livelihood decision-making is drawn from a CHTDF-UNDP survey of 
indigenous households living in CHT for the year 2007, while the qualitative 
insights came from the fieldwork conducted in 2010. The quantitative data 
used and analysed can be treated as an outsider (etic) view of the reality while 
the qualitative data may be considered as the insider (emic) view of the same. 
In this research the household is considered as unit of analysis and the 
operational scale is the CHT region as a whole. 
3.4 Quantitative data and source5   
Data generated by “Socio-economic Baseline Survey of Chittagong Hill Tracts” 
has been used in this study. This survey was commissioned in 2007 and the 
survey report was published by CHTDF-UNDP in 2009. Survey was 
                                                 
5 This section is written on the basis of information documented in the survey report 
written by Barkat et al. (2009). 
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conducted by Human Development Research Centre (HDRC) and this 
researcher was a member in the study team. Data was collected for the year 
2007 from a cross section of households (both Bengali speaking settler and 
Indigenous population) living in CHT. According to the purpose of this paper, 
a part of the dataset considering only indigenous households was used. 
Because of personal involvement, the researcher had a deeper understanding of 
the data collection tools and insights into the dataset. This researcher was 
involved in questionnaire designing, training of the enumerators, supervising 
field data collection process, data coding, cleaning and finally writing the 
survey report. Since the data set is not available in the public domain, due 
permission was taken from the organization (CHTDF-UNDP) to use the data 
set. 
 
3.4.1 Sampling and data collection 
Sample design of the survey captured the whole region of CHT and the 
diversity of indigenous population. The total number of sample households 
was 3,238 and the number of indigenous households was 1,786. The sampling 
procedure carefully considered the geographical and ethnic diversity of CHT 
and its population. The survey is representative for households in CHT as a 
whole and also by ethnicity. It used random sampling technique to select the 
primary sample unit (PSU) - called para in CHT - and the households in each 
contacted PSU. To ensure random selection of households a complete 
household listing was done in each selected para to ensure unbiasedness. 
The survey included variables on socio-economic characteristics of CHT 
population. The broader categories of measurable variables are demographic, 
economic, social and cultural, infrastructure facilities, and peace-confidence 
building. The survey followed a long and rigorous process of developing data 
collection tools. A detailed instruction manual was prepared to fill-in the 
questionnaire and clarifications regarding the questions. The language of the 
questionnaire and manual was Bengali, but the language of the community is 
non-Bengali. To meet this challenge, the survey recruited University students 
as enumerators who belonged to the indigenous community and conducted 
repeated piloting of data collection tools to minimize language problems. 
However, accuracy of data may have suffered because of lack of proper 
supervision of enumerators (e.g. geographic setting created problems of 
communication) and there were still language problems in interpreting 
questions at the time of interviewing which was discovered in the feedback 
sessions after completion of survey. 
 
3.4.2 Quantitative data on perception of threat of violence 
The original survey was not designed to analyse violence issues in CHT. 
However, data on different types of violence in the form of either household’s 
experience or perceptions under the categories of ‘obstacles to peace’ and 
‘element of confidence-building’ was collected.  Data on real life experience of 
violence were collected for the period of ten years (1998-2007) after the Peace 
Accord; whereas perceptual data on violence was for the year 2007 only. This 
study primarily uses the variables which are based on household perception on 
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different types of violence for the year 2007. The reason for choosing the 
perceptual data on violence is that the survey collected data on violence 
perception and socio-economic or livelihood status for the single year 2007 
which makes the data set compatible with straightforward cross-sectional 
regression analysis. Also the data on experiences of violence was collected for 
post peace accord period (1998-2007) and there is a strong possibility of under 
reporting of the actual violence events faced by individual households due to 
safety and security considerations. In this formal post conflict situation, 
household perceptions of general threats from different types of violence can 
work as proxy for household specific ‘threat of violence’ at household level 
(Rizal and Yokota, 2006). 
A composite index variable for threat perceptions of violence was 
constructed as part of this research, as the original survey used 31 indicators to 
show the present status of threat of violence in CHT perceived by households. 
Likert scales were used in the questionnaire to collect data on threats of 
violence. Under the broad heading of ‘obstacles to peace’ data was collected by 
using three point qualitative value scale while under broad heading of ‘element 
of confidence-building’ a five point qualitative value scale was used. Each scale 
was devised as per the specificity and nature of each variable. The scale 
contained qualitative value labels (Likert scale) and quantitative (numeric) 
interpretations for each of the threat levels. In the present study, 13 indicators 
have been selected from the 31 indicators used in the original survey to 
construct a composite violence index.  
To ensure consistency in the value level of the Likert scale used for all the 
indicators under ‘obstacles to peace’ and ‘element of confidence-building’, an 
adjustment has been made by re-coding the qualitative value level with new 
numeric interpretation. The new Likert scale contains three point values scale 
where low=1, Medium=2 and High=3. The new value scale with numeric 
interpretation has been done by re-coding of original values used in the survey. 
On the five point scale, the minimum value level (0 or 1) represents 
lowest/worst status while the maximum value level (3 or 4) indicates 
highest/best situation on ‘constraint of peace’ and ‘element of confidence-
building’. This re-coding process involved rigorous discussion with the team 
leader involved in the survey for validation (for detail see Appendix B).  
The value of composite index for perceived threat of violence is the 
summation of the numeric values achieved by each household against each 
indicator. All the indicators are assigned equal weight. The formula of this 
construction of threat of violence index is as follows; 
Composite violence index, 


13
1i
ixX   
Where, xi denotes the value of indicators of violence 
(i=1,2,3,………….,13) 
 
From the estimation it is found that the lowest value for the composite 
violence index is 13 while the highest value is 32. Thus an individual household 
can get any value between13 to 32. At this stage households are grouped into 
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three distinct, equal interval categories according to the level of value of 
violence index. The categorization is as follows; 
Category 1: Household perceiving low violence scores 13 to 19 in 
composite violence index 
Category 2: Household perceiving medium violence scores 20 to 26 in 
composite violence index 
Category 3: Household perceiving high violence scores 27 to 32 in 
composite violence index 
From the above categorization, a new variable ‘Perception of violence’, a 
categorical variable was created with a value level ranging from 1 to 3, with the 
low violence perception dummy serving as the reference point. This 
categorization of households shows that 55% of indigenous households 
perceived low levels of violence, 36% households perceived medium level of 
violence, and 9% households  perceived high violence (see Appendix A). 
 
3.4.3 Data on household livelihood decision-making 
Consumption Expenditure 
Data on consumption expenditure was collected by using separate format on 
food and non-food expenditure from households. The original survey collected 
the data on amount of food consumed by items for a (average) representative 
week by household and average price for these food items was also collected 
from the village level by interviewing the knowledgeable people of the village. 
Later on, the study team extrapolated the weekly data for a year and calculated 
the amount of expenditure on food consumption made by each household. 
The non-food expenditure includes expenditure on clothing, housing, 
education and health. Calculation procedure for both food and non-food 
consumption expenditure used the imputation methodology to monetize the 
expenditure where the consumption item was not bought or domestically 
produced. Extrapolation of consumption expenditure did not consider the 
seasonality issue of food security. Extrapolation and monetization 
methodology may compromise the accuracy of the data. Although the 
researchers acknowledged the problem of measurement error, they did not give 
any indication of extent of measurement error. The average per capita annual 
cash-equivalent consumption expenditure for a household was Tk. 11,838, 
with Tk. 11,087 and Tk.4,309 for food and non-food consumption 
respectively. 
 
Investment decision; enrolment of children 
Data on total number of children enrolled in both primary and secondary 
school was collected at the household level. It is difficult to use this household 
level data on enrolment as the regression model needs child specific variables 
like age, sex, and type of school in relation to enrolment status. Household 
background information was used to generate enrolment data as it kept all 
demographic and education related information for all the household 
members. Children included were in the age bracket of 6 to 18 years and were 
identified as currently being students in the data on enrolment. The age bracket 
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of 6 to 18 years which is a bit higher than the standard age for this level of 
education was used because of the fact of late enrolment of children in the 
region. Estimate showed that 41% children in this age bracket are enrolled in 
school. 
 
Production decision; type of crop produced 
Data on types of crop produced show that 35 different types of crops are 
produced by indigenous households in CHT. At the first stage of data 
processing, these crops are grouped into food and cash crops. This grouping 
exercise is problematic because some crops can be considered as both cash and 
food crops. Households are then categorised into one or other or ‘mixed’. 
Purpose of growing particular crops is considered as the basis of such 
grouping. It is found that about 36% households grow only food crops and 
1.5% households grow only cash crops while about 62% households are 
growing mixed crops (both food and cash). 
3.5 Qualitative data and source 
Qualitative data collected in the present study is to complement the 
quantitative analysis and assist interpretation of quantitative results. Group data 
collection techniques such as FGD, transect walk type PRA and in-depth 
interview technique such as KII were used. PRA was used to get into the 
community and FGDs were used to understand people’s motivations and 
aspirations behind decision-making. KIIs were used to get insight into the 
livelihoods of indigenous peoples with people like karbari (village/para chief), 
Headman (mouza chief) and personnel from NGOs and development partners. In 
addition, academic researchers and activists who were working on indigenous 
peoples issues in and outside the CHT were consulted as key informants. 
Moreover, direct observation was a helpful technique to get primary insights 
into local context. 
The locations for the qualitative research were selected purposively. 
Selection of the locations in the three district of CHT was made according to 
violence intensity. The primary results from quantitative data on violence show 
that the district Bandarban is the lowest violence prone area compared to 
Rangamati and Khagrachari districts. The numbers of FGD and PRA sessions 
(5) were distributed among the three districts as per the violence intensity. Two 
transect walk type PRA and FGD were conducted in Khagrachari and 
Rangamati district while one transect walk type PRA and FGD each was 
conducted in Bandarban. In most of the cases FGD sessions were conducted 
in NGO schools situated in the village and established with the help of 
villagers. For conducting qualitative research, a three member team was formed 
with a composition of a facilitator and a note taker along with the researcher. 
The recruited facilitator and note taker for PRA and FGD were University 
students from the indigenous communities as they knew the local language. 
Transect type of PRA exercise helped to get into the community, get 
accustomed with the situations and provide wide scope for observations. It 
gave the researcher the opportunity to interact with the local community 
leaders and other community people and build up a rapport with them. During 
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transect walk, discussions concerned the present situation of livelihoods and 
threats of violence in the community. A semi structured guide line was 
followed in FGD session (Appendix-B). During FGD sessions, indigenous 
men and women discussed their experience on livelihood decision-making 
under threat of violence freely. Though they participated in the discussion with 
openness, we could not discuss few sensitive issues regarding conflict with the 
military and role of the groups opposing the Peace Accord. I had planned to 
record the conversations but the participants did not allow me to do so. Note 
taking was done in Bengali language by the facilitator and note-taker who knew 
both of the languages. The researcher translated the necessary parts of 
transcribed Bengali conversation into English as where and when necessary. 
Finally, observations during the researcher’s stay in villages were documented 
by diary method which helped interpret the reality.  
3.6 Reflexivity   
Reflexivity is an important issue in conducting field research especially 
qualitative investigation where certain personal characteristics and relationships 
of the researcher can influence the information provided by respondents. 
These include ethnic identity, my relationship with indigenous community and 
language. My ethnic and religious identity belongs to the Bengali speaking 
settler community with whom the indigenous community has conflict relation. 
The relation between me and the indigenous community can be referred to as 
‘etic’. Therefore, it was a tremendous challenge for me to get their trust and 
confidence. I believe that I have overcome the challenge with the help of my 
two indigenous friends with whom I worked earlier also in the same region. I 
along with my friends stayed at the village and shared the same food. Before 
going to the villages, the local community leaders (e.g. headman and karbari) 
were contacted and had to be convinced about the objectives of my research. 
However, at the beginning of each FGD session I faced a lot of questions 
regarding my identity and purpose of the research. My indigenous friends and 
local community leaders helped me overcome the situation. For ice-breaking, I 
showed my photographs taken during my previous work with indigenous 
peoples of the region and sometimes tried to use some of their language.   
Another challenge faced during field work was language. PRA, FGD 
sessions and interviews with indigenous community leaders were conducted in 
indigenous language. As data collection process requires proper understanding 
of respondents, clarification of different terms, words, expression, concepts 
and interruption; asking for frequent clarifications in conversation can make 
the data collection process more complex and laborious. Moreover, 
transcription of the interview and conversation into Bengali and afterward in 
English was also a daunting task. When necessary, I called or sent English 
transcription or summary of conversation or interview to the facilitator and 
note-taker to get their validation of an expression.  
Finally, regarding disclosure of information provided by the indigenous 
people I assured them that they would remain anonymous in the write up of 
the research paper to ensure their security. 
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3.7 Analysis technique for quantitative data 
Descriptive and analytical statistical tools have been applied to analyze 
quantitative data. Quantitative analysis primarily focuses on the relation or 
association between perceived threat of violence and livelihood decision-
making. At the first stage, statistical tools such as bi-variate analysis and non-
parametric tests were used. In the later stage, appropriate econometric models 
(regression techniques) were devised to explain relationships by using OLS, 
LPM, Logit and Probit models. 
Using cross-section data meant the regression model had to be carefully 
specified on the basis of empirical studies related to the present topic to 
address endogeneity problem in estimation procedure. However, the 
estimation procedure suffers from a specification problem due to absence of 
time variant unobserved variables plus lack of data on some variables in the 
dataset which are omitted variables in the model (Wooldridge 2003). 
For consumption decisions an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-
stage Least Squares (2SLS) model, and for investment in children’s education 
and production (cropping) decisions a Logit or Probit model, were specified. 
The latter two tools measure the probability or chance of an event occurring. 
The standard regression equation is as follows: 
Yi = α + β1 HSEij + β2Hij + β3 Cij + β4 Sij + β5 Vij + β6PVij + εi 
Where the dependent variable, Yi refers to various livelihood decision-making 
variables, consisting of  consumption expenditure (continuous variable), child 
enrolment in both primary and secondary school (dummy variable) and type of 
crop produced (dummy variable) for house-hold i measured at the survey. The 
explanatory variables are as follows: HSEij are household-level demographic 
and socio-economic variables, Cij is a set of child characteristics (age and sex), 
Hij is the household heads’ characteristics (age, sex and education), Sij denotes 
school level variable, Vij means variables for perceived threat of violence, PVij 
indicates pre-peace accord experience of  violence and εi is a random error 
term. One of our dependent variables, child enrolment, will be related to 
lagged explanatory variables used in interaction form.  
Table 3.1 shows the summary of specifications for household livelihood 
decision-making represented by consumption, investment and production 
decision on the basis of empirical studies related with the present topic.  
3.8 Triangulation 
Combining both quantitative and qualitative data analysis should be considered 
as strength of this study. Findings from different methods and analysis 
techniques have been used to answer the research questions. Combining both 
quantitative and qualitative data analysis allows triangulation. The regression 
results show the association between the threat of violence and household 
livelihood decision-making while the qualitative data is used to interpret and 
substantiate the quantitative findings. 
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TABLE 3.1 
 Summary of variables included in regression model 
Production Decision Equation  Endogenous variable Consumption 
Decision Equa-
tion  
Investment  
decision:  
Child Enrolment   
Equation  
Amount of land 
cultivated 
Type of crops 
produced 
Per capita annual consumption expen-
diture (food and non-food) 
LHS    
Child enrolment in primary and sec-
ondary school 
 LHS   
Amount of land cultivated   LHS  
Type of crops produced    LHS 
Exogenous variables 
Household size √ √ √ √ 
Age of household head  √ √ √ √ 
Sex of household head √ √ √ √ 
HH head never attended school* √ √ √ √ 
HH head completed primary school √ √ √ √ 
HH head completed secondary School √ √ √ √ 
HH head completed above secondary 
School 
√ √ √ √ 
Age of child  √   
Age square of child  √   
Sex of child  √   
Proportion of enrolled children √    
Government school   √   
NGO school  √   
Private school  √   
Other type of school*  √   
Language of book   √   
Medium of instruction in school   √   
Per capita HH asset √ √   
HH electrification status √    
Food crop*   √ √ 
Cash crop   √ √ 
Both food and cash crop   √ √ 
Plough cultivation*   √ √ 
Jum cultivation   √ √ 
Both Jum and plough cultivation   √ √ 
Amount of land cultivated    √ 
Perception of violence √    
Low level of perceived violence* √ √ √ √ 
Medium level of perceived violence √ √ √ √ 
High level of perceived violence √ √ √ √ 
Experience of armed conflict before 
peace accord 
√    
Casualty before peace accord √    
Interaction variables  √   
Notes: LHS indicates that a variable is included as endogenous variable in the left-hand-side of the equation. 
‘√’ indicates that a variable is included as exogenous variable.  * denotes reference category 
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4  Livelihood decision-making under threat of  violence 
4.1 Introduction 
The current analysis is going to assess the influence of different levels of 
perceived risk of violence as on livelihoods’ decision-making assuming this 
decision-making has produced intended outcomes, which were accurately 
observed in the survey. This chapter presents the findings based on 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the influence of perceived violence on 
livelihood decision-making at household level. In the present analysis 
households’ perceptions of violence can be treated as potential, though 
uncertain, shocks faced by households which may influence their decisions. 
Analysis aims to find if livelihood decision-making varies with the changing 
perception of violence using the sustainable livelihood framework. For ease of 
analysis, livelihood decision-making elements (variables) are grouped into three 
different and distinct categories which are consumption decision, investment 
decision and production decision. Under consumption decision I have 
considered both food and non-food consumption expenditure as the proxy for 
the consumption decisions taken by households. Long term investment 
decisions have been represented by children’s school enrolment. Finally, 
decisions on involvement in types of cultivation, amount of land cultivated and 
type of crop produced have been considered under the production decision. 
4.2 Influence of perceived violence on household 
consumption expenditure 
The indigenous population living in CHT is relatively poor as compared to the 
people living in other parts of Bangladesh according to commonly used 
poverty measurements; cost of basic needs and direct calorie intake methods 
(Adnan 2004 and Barkat et al. 2009). Socio-economic and cultural structure of 
indigenous society have important roles in determining household decisions 
regarding consumption. In structure the CHT indigenous society is still largely 
governed by the customs and culture not by market forces (Adnan 2004). Cash 
equivalent non-food expenditure (6%) has been found to be extremely low 
compared to the food expenditure (94%) in CHT. According to the BBS 2007, 
nationally share of food expenditure and non-food expenditure are 54% and 
46% respectively. History suggests that as society develops (moving from 
subsistence economy to surplus economy with structural transformation) the 
share of food expenditure decreases while the non-food expenditure increases. 
The indigenous communities are still producing their own clothing and food 
and therefore the price for these commodities is relatively cheap (the Survey 
used local market prices). Education and health expenditure is also low because 
of low enrolment rate of children in school and low rate of using State and 
marketised health facilities (Barkat et al. 2009). 
Average amount of per capita annual cash-equivalent consumption 
expenditure is Tk. 11,838. A variation in the amount of per capita annual 
consumption expenditure in relation to various levels of perceived violence has 
been found. The amount of per capita annual consumption expenditure is 
inversely related with the levels of perceived violence where it is estimated that 
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an average household perceiving low violence spent an amount of Tk. 12,027 
per person per annum while a household perceiving high violence spent an 
amount of Tk. 10,760 which is 10.5% lower as compared to those household 
who perceived low violence (Table 4.1). Between the groups of households 
perceiving low and medium violence there is small (2%) variation in 
consumption expenditure. Compared to an average household’s annual 
consumption expenditure per person, the household perceiving high violence 
spend 9% less.  
TABLE 4.1 
 Per capita annual consumption expenditure in relation to perceived threat of violence 
Perceived violence level Per capita annual consumption 
expenditure (Tk.) 
Standard deviation 
Low violence 12,027 4505 
Medium violence 11,783 4682 
High violence 10,760 3464 
Overall 11,838 4518 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
With regard to household consumption decisions, we examine the 
influence of violence perception on consumption expenditure as a whole and 
for food and non-food consumption expenditure separately. There may be 
endogeneity between consumption expenditure and perception of violence and 
therefore the OLS coefficient for perception of violence in consumption 
expenditure (total consumption expenditure, food consumption expenditure 
and non-food consumption expenditure) regression can give biased estimates 
(annex table 5 for the OLS estimate). This is because households with more 
economic capacity can perceive more violence, and vice versa. To get 
consistent coefficient estimates for consumption expenditure regression we use 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation approach where at the first stage we 
are in need to choose an instrumental variable to solve this endogeniety 
problem. There are a few variables in our dataset that are potential candidates 
for instruments. We choose the variable ‘previous experience of armed 
conflict’. This is the active participation of any household member in and/or 
exposure to armed violence before peace accord of 1997 (i.e during 1977-
1997). In regression equation for non-food consumption expenditure our 
instrument ‘previous experience of armed conflict’ was found ineffective, and 
we therefore used ‘previous casualties’ as our instrumental variable. This refers 
to whether any member(s) of household was wounded or killed during the war. 
The identified instrumental variables were found exogenous by Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (F statistics). Experience of previous armed violence and the 
incidence of casualties are likely to be highly correlated with current violence 
perception, but less with consumption for two reasons. The first reason is the 
time gap between participation in previous armed conflict (1977-1997) and 
current consumption expenditure. Secondly, the violence level in CHT 
happened before peace accord (1997) is considered to be low intensity violence 
and did not do much damage to the already low amount of infrastructure. 
Verwimp and Bundervoet (2008) review evidence suggesting that welfare and 
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TABLE 4.2 
 Determinants of consumption expenditure: OLS estimation 
Dependent variables 
Total consumption 
expenditure 
Food consumption 
expenditure 
Non-food consumption 
expenditure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Explanatory 
variables 
Violence 
perception:  
1st stage 
Total 
consumption 
expenditure 
 IV-2SLS 
Violence 
perception:  
1st stage 
Food 
consumption 
expenditure  
IV-2SLS 
Violence 
perception:  
1st stage 
Non-food 
consumption 
expenditure  
IV-2SLS 
HH size  0.00201 -0.0490***  0.0120 -0.0498*** -0.00336 -0.0980*** 
 (0.00928) (0.00473) (0.00814) (0.00442) (0.0100) (0.00631) 
Age of HH 
head 
-0.000933 -0.00101 -0.00149 -0.00122* -0.000294  0.00116 
 (0.00137) (0.000697) (0.00122) (0.000663) (0.00147) (0.000932) 
Sex of HH 
head 
  0.0177   0.0511*** -0.00113   0.0283   0.00259   0.0627** 
 (0.0370) (0.0189) (0.0331) (0.0180) (0.0399) (0.0252) 
HH head 
completed 
primary 
education 
 0.0584  0.00880  0.0178  0.0225  0.0918**  0.0206 
 (0.0432) (0.0222) (0.0386) (0.0210) (0.0464) (0.0408) 
HH head 
completed 
secondary 
education  
 0.0713  0.0357  0.0304  0.0365  0.102**  0.00405 
 (0.0475) (0.0245) (0.0428) (0.0233) (0.0510) (0.0469) 
HH head 
completed 
above 
secondary 
education 
-0.0883 -0.0592 -0.248 -0.0658  0.0683  0.251* 
 (0.219) (0.111) (0.174) (0.0945) (0.235) (0.149) 
HH 
electrification 
 0.142***  0.0236  0.0427  0.0151  0.129**  0.0646 
 (0.0470) (0.0244) (0.0411) (0.0223) (0.0506) (0.0507) 
Per capita 
asset  
-7.20e-07  1.48e-06*** -5.86e-07  1.83e-06*** -1.10e-06  1.94e-06*** 
 (6.59e-07) (3.39e-07) (6.46e-07) (3.52e-07) (7.12e-07) (5.98e-07) 
Proportion of 
enrolled 
children  
  0.351*** -0.0430 - -  0.390***  0.0203 
 (0.0454) (0.0269) - - (0.0487) (0.127) 
Previous 
experience 
of armed 
conflict 
 0.540*** -  0.542*** - - - 
 (0.0379) - (0.0350) - - - 
Previous 
casualty 
- - - - -0.167** - 
 - - - - (0.0839) - 
Perception 
of violence  
- -0.0837** - -0.0741** - -0.266 
 - (0.0358) - (0.0350) - (0.317) 
Constant  1.223***  9.712***  1.435***  9.616***  1.360***  7.299*** 
 (0.0866) (0.0652) (0.0691) (0.0668) (0.0931) (0.430) 
F  0.2663 -  0.3090 -  0.5784 - 
Observations  1,285  1,285  1,629  1,629  1,285  1,285 
R-squared  0.185  0.113  0.134  0.103  0.058  0.190 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
 32
past shocks, including conflict are highly correlated, but not after the passage 
of a decade. But, subjective perceptions of violence are likely to be related to 
actual experiences of violence, however long ago. Our results (2SLS 
estimation) suggest that there is significant negative relationship between 
perceived violence and consumption expenditure decisions. The IV coefficient 
for perception of violence in column 2 of table 4.2 indicates negative influence 
of 8.4% on total consumption expenditure and this IV coefficient for 
perception of violence is almost double of the corresponding OLS estimate. 
The adverse influence is also found significant for food consumption 
expenditure. Household perceiving violence reduces their food consumption 
expenditure by about 7.5% (column 4 of table 4.2) which is higher than the 
corresponding OLS estimation (4.1%). Such rise in the value of coefficient 
after using instrumental variable indicates a negative correlation between the 
errors in the total as well as food consumption expenditure equation and the 
perception of violence equation. The IV estimation does not show significant 
influence of perception of violence on non-food consumption expenditure, 
although the sign is negative. In the OLS estimate the relationship is negative 
and significant (annex table 5). We have to bear in mind that food has a much 
more significant weight (94%) compared to non-food items (6%) in the 
average household’s consumption basket (see the descriptive statistics in annex 
table 1). As expected, household size influences the amount of per capita 
consumption expenditure (total, food and non-food) negatively and per capita 
household asset (in monetary terms) influences the same positively. In 
addition, male headed household spend more on consumption expenditure 
compared to female headed households which is found statistically significant 
for total and non-food consumption expenditure. Households where the head 
has above secondary education spend 25% more on non-food consumption 
expenditure. 
This negative influence of perceived violence on consumption expenditure 
can be understood by considering perceived violence as an anticipated ‘shock’ 
factor in decision-making. More importantly, the relationship between different 
levels of perceived violence and amount of consumption expenditure is 
interpreted here by considering households as active decision makers rather 
than passive victims of violence. From the investment and production point of 
view, the households perceiving higher level of violence can then be seen as 
more interested to save or to invest on production and on developing human 
capital compared to those households who perceive less violence. Such a 
motivation for investment and production may lower consumption, especially 
monetary expenditure. This may not be a general picture but it can be more 
applicable for relatively affluent households. The higher influence of perceived 
violence on non-food consumption expenditure decision can be explained by 
the fact that when households face any type of adverse situation they will first 
reduce their non-food monetised expenditure. 
In the qualitative research, household decision-making experience on 
consumption spending was found to be complex among the households. 
Households explained their experience of consumption expenditure decisions 
in a number of ways in FGD sessions and at various interactions with the 
indigenous peoples during my stay in the villages. It has been found that some 
households are frustrated about their future and therefore pessimistic in their 
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decision making. An FGD participant from Chakma community who is also an 
internally displaced per-son because of land dispossession by new settlers 
expressed his feelings about the future and the challenges of the present in the 
following terms:  
whatever amount (of course small) we earn we are earning to consume or to 
survive. There is no matter of conscious decision. We do not have any guarantee 
of our lives and assets because of conflict with Bengalee settlers and army. We do 
not know when we can see our bright future. 
On the other hand, there are some people who have been trying to make their 
lives in a better way and they are slightly optimistic about the future in the post 
peace accord period. A young couple perceiving high risk of violence in 
Khagrachari district shared their feelings about expenditure decision-making in 
an interaction with this researcher as “we are not earning much but we have to 
be careful about the amount of consumption expenditure as we do not have 
another re-source for our future. We are just eating to survive, not spending 
for availing any luxury in our lives.” 
An indigenous community leader in Khagrachari district, a violence prone 
region, argued that “after the peace accord a number of reconstructions and 
development work is underway in the CHT. NGO workers are working with 
us to raise our consciousness. They are motivating us not to consume 
everything else rather to try to save for the future. Slowly people are moving 
towards savings and careful consumption decision”. 
 4.3 Influence of perceived violence on investment decision 
Investment in human capital in CHT is especially important since 
improvement of human capital enables people to possibly increase their future 
productivity, to participate more remunerative employment and potentially 
migrate (UNDP, 1995). In terms of time horizons, investment can be short 
term and long term while in terms of livelihood framework investment can be 
made for developing physical capital, human capital, social capital, natural 
capital, and political capital. Decisions to enrol children in school can be a 
proxy of investment decision on human capital development at micro level. 
Considering children enrolment as an investment, decision is arguably correct 
in developing countries in particular, since the enrolment of the children is not 
free of cost from economic point of view. Households need to pay educational 
expenses incurred as well as to sacrifice the economic contribution of children 
as child labourer where child is doing household chores or in paid work 
outside the household (Bedi and Marshall 2002). 
Bangladesh has gained remarkable progress in achieving universal primary 
education due to substantial programmatic interventions started in 1990s. In 
the year 2006, 81% children (6 to 10 years) were enrolled in primary school 
while it was 60% in 1990. The overall primary school enrolment scenario in the 
whole Chittagong division (83%) was slightly better than the national scenario 
in 2006. However, estimates (on the basis of secondary data used in this 
research) on enrolment scenario in CHT is discouraging as only 41.5 % 
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children are enrolled in primary and secondary school (6 to 18 years)6. 
However, some people of the indigenous communities (e.g. the Chakma) have 
made remarkable progress in education (Adnan 2004). 
Descriptive statistics show that 33% households perceiving low violence 
are sending their children to school while the statistics is 39% for households 
perceiving medium level of violence. The proportion of sending children to 
school increases to 43% among the households perceiving high level of 
violence. The difference in child enrolment rates between household with low 
and high level of violence perception is about a third of the lower figure. The 
estimated variation in children enrolment in relation to different level of 
perceived violence is found to be statistically significant in a non-parametric test 
(Table 4.3).  
TABLE 4.3 
 Influence of perceived violence on children enrolment in school 
Perceived violence level Children enrolment (%) 
Low violence 33 
Medium violence 39 
High violence 43 
Overall 41 
* Pearson chi2 Pr = 0.027 (to three significant places) 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
Our Probit regression results in table 4.4 indicate that variation in the 
likelihood of children’s enrolment is not significantly explained by differences 
in perceived violence as the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The 
variables on actual experiences of violence (displacement, land dispossession 
and experience; participation in or victim of armed conflict) are also found to 
be insignificant.  But introducing interaction terms for variables on pre-peace 
accord experience of violence and post-conflict perceived violence engenders 
statistical significance. The statistical significance of the interaction term points 
to the existence of a more complex mechanism linking fears of violence to 
local child enrolment. In other words, current perceptions of violence do 
impact on whether households choose to school their children locally, but it is 
related to other factors such as earlier experiences of violence, emigration and 
land dispossession. 
The interaction between displacement (which means the household left 
during the conflict and subsequently returned) and current perceived high 
violence is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the 
households who were displaced before the peace accord, and currently 
perceive high violence, are more likely to send children to school (32.5%) 
compared to households who also migrated but perceive low violence levels.  
                                                 
6 Data on the both primary and secondary school enrolment for the CHT is not 
available in the published national statistics and Chittagong division is not 
representative for the CHT. Therefore the estimate on enrolment (primary and 
secondary) made by author on the basis of survey data can be a better representation 
of the situation for indigenous people. 
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TABLE 4.4 
 Determinants of child enrolment in school: regression result 
Dependent variable; Child Enrolment Explanatory variable 
Logit, mfx Probit, mfx 
1 2 3 
Age of child 0.147*** 0.139*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0129) 
Age square of child -0.00571*** -0.00535*** 
 (0.000747) (0.000705) 
Sex of child 0.0167 0.0263 
 (0.0358) (0.0332) 
Age of HH head 0.000459 0.000447 
 (0.00124) (0.00119) 
Sex of HH head 0.0241 0.0250 
 (0.0344) (0.0331) 
Primary education of HHH 0.0475 0.0438 
 (0.0403) (0.0383) 
Secondary education of HHH  0.0420 0.0421 
 (0.0445) (0.0425) 
Above secondary education of HHH  -0.345*** -0.364*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0587) 
Government school  0.0769** 0.0746** 
 (0.0362) (0.0347) 
NGO school 0.154*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0547) 
Private school -0.0132 -0.0198 
 (0.0926) (0.0916) 
Language of book 0.437* 0.427* 
 (0.261) (0.244) 
Medium of instruction -0.367* -0.373** 
 (0.190) (0.185) 
HH size 0.00582 0.00620 
 (0.00886) (0.00858) 
HH asset 2.61e-07 2.49e-07 
 (2.75e-07) (2.57e-07) 
Perceived medium violence -0.0121 -0.0117 
 (0.0416) (0.0400) 
Perceived high violence -0.184** -0.189** 
 (0.0752) (0.0771) 
Migration -0.0710 -0.0718 
 (0.0717) (0.0705) 
Land dispossession 0.148** 0.140** 
 (0.0624) (0.0586) 
Past armed conflict -0.0101 -0.00360 
 (0.0677) (0.0658) 
Migration and perceived medium violence 0.0280 0.0385 
 (0.119) (0.112) 
Displacement and perceived high violence 0.326** 0.325** 
 (0.140) (0.139) 
Land dispossession and perceived medium violence 0.00373 0.00480 
 (0.0916) (0.0860) 
Land dispossession and perceived high violence -0.285*** -0.293*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0746) 
Past armed conflict and perceived medium violence 0.0358 0.0271 
 (0.0911) (0.0872) 
Past armed conflict and perceived high violence 0.267** 0.258** 
 (0.124) (0.119) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
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Similarly, households that experienced armed conflict before the peace 
accord, and currently perceive high violence are more likely to school children 
(26%) compared to households who experienced armed conflict and currently 
perceive low violence. 
This mutual reinforcing element in the combined violence variable is not 
applicable to households who experienced land dispossession before the peace 
accord. Our estimates suggest that households who experienced land 
dispossession before the peace accord, along with a high violence perception 
are less likely to school their children (29%), compared to those who also 
experienced land dispossession before the peace accord, but perceive low 
violence. The experience of land dispossession is traumatic, and creates huge 
economic vulnerabilities, as land is the most productive asset. This may lower 
the likelihood of their sending their children to school, possibly due to 
rejection of Bengali culture. There are limited economic incentives for school 
enrolment in the few educational institutions with free food and residential 
facilities established with the support of government and donors in CHT to 
enhance human capital development (Shelley 1992). But the primary 
‘investment’ motivation for schooling children is to allow future generations to 
acquire credentials so that they can escape the conflict and are less dependent 
on agriculture. This includes increased prospects of gaining formal and public 
sector jobs for their children. 
The difference among the households perceiving different levels of 
violence in sending children to school is mostly driven by economic 
considerations. Indigenous people pointed to the increasing challenge to 
earning livelihoods from crop production and extraction of forest resources 
because of rapid growing population of both indigenous and the settler 
population. Statement from one FGD session claimed: “traditionally we were 
dependent on land and it was sufficient for producing our subsistence but day 
by day it becomes more difficult to get required amount of subsistence. In 
some villages we do not have enough land to allocate for our next generation 
who are newly married and forming new households. We are sending our 
children to school so that they can find their employment in somewhere other 
than jum”. 
Key informant interviews and interactions with the people working in 
development sector at the grass-root level explored reasons why households 
perceiving high violence are more determined to get permanent and secure 
employment or earning source. A NGO worker born in a highly violent area 
told of his experience as “my parents were displaced from their ancestral land 
and always afraid of complete eviction from the village. They sent me to school 
soon after signing of peace accord and I completed my higher secondary 
education in the recent past. My parents did a lot for my education so that I 
could get a job and support my life without fear of losing anything.”   
Indigenous people fearing violence perceive the relevance of education as 
the most precious resources since nobody can steal it. An indigenous woman 
from Naniarchar Upzilla (violence prone area) of Rangamati district narrated 
her feelings during FGD session as “our land is grabbed, our crop is stolen or 
damaged and even our household movable assets are robbed or burnt. But if 
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we educate our children, nobody can destroy this resource. Our children are 
studying at school to have a secure livelihood option in the future”.  
However; sceptical attitudes towards the ultimate expected benefit to be 
gained in future from investment on education of children was also disclosed 
by few of the indigenous leaders in their conversation with me during my stay 
at their communities. In Dighinala Upzilla of Kha-grachari District (highly 
violence prone area) I met an indigenous community leader who donated land 
for establishment of a local primary school. He expressed his views as  
“unemployment is not only a serious problem of CHT but also for Bangladesh 
as a whole. A few numbers of indigenous students has got job what they 
expected but most of them do not. We have a quota in government job but it 
is so limited that even the relatively advanced indigenous community does not 
get employment. A new phenomenon of corruption (giving bribe) along with 
nepotism for getting government job has been appeared in the employment 
market which makes me anxious and pessimistic. However; we cannot escape 
from sending children to school”.  
A few indigenous people also expressed their grief regarding the negative 
impact of education on their traditions, customs and culture. They were 
discussing issue of cultural change that is happening through education in their 
society. They raised their voice in the FGD as saying “sending children to 
school may be good for future income earning but it is destructive for our 
culture. Our children who are going to school they are wearing the dress of 
Bengali speaking people. They mingle with Bengali speaking children and carry 
their culture to our community. Now we are using a variety of commodities in 
our house which is not produced by us”.  
4.4 Influence of perceived violence on production decisions 
Historically, economic activities of indigenous people have been 
concentrated in agriculture and forest resource extraction. Agricultural 
activities include crop production, fishing, cattle rearing, and raising poultry. In 
addition, livelihood activities included weaving and making clothes, and 
brewing alcohol and handicrafts. Non-agricultural activities are not widely 
available in this region and extent of market participation as well as exchange is 
also affected by cultural norms prevailing in the society (Adnan 2004).  
Own-farm agricultural production especially crop production is the main 
production (economic) activity for indigenous people. In this research, 
production decisions will be discussed in terms of crop production decisions. 
Three decisions regarding agricultural production are considered. These 
decisions are involvement in forms of agriculture (cropping own land), amount 
of land actually cultivated in 2007, and types of crops produced.  An attempt is 
made to analyze to what extent different intensities of perceived violence are 
affecting decision making processes on these three production decisions. 
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4.4.1 Influence of perceived violence on involvement in 
cultivation 
Historically the main component of consumption basket of indigenous people 
is rice which they produced as much as possible themselves. Rice is needed for 
everyday subsistence plus for festivals, entertainment of guests and other 
socio-cultural obligation.  Rice is mostly grown in jum or swidden cultivation 
on hill slopes which are typically covered with shrubs and various kinds of 
trees when not used for cultivation. Besides this dominant type of cultivation, 
some members of indigenous communities, namely Chakma, Marma and 
Tripura, also produce wet rice by using plough cultivation on the plains in the 
CHT.  Because of the technical nature of jum farming, cultivated land needs to 
be left fallow for a period of several years to regain fertility.  
Transmigration of Bengali speaking population, takeover of land by 
various government agencies in the name of development of physical 
infrastructure and protection of forest has up-rooted parts of the indigenous 
population from their ancestral land which in turn restricts their use of land for 
cultivation (Adnan, 2004). A large number of indigenous households (more 
than 90,000) as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) did not get 
back their dispossessed land as had been promised in the peace accord. Against 
this backdrop, an attempt has been taken in this research to explore the 
scenario of household involvement in cultivation work in relation to household 
perceptions of violence in the post-conflict CHT.  
A majority of indigenous households (60%) engage in cropping their own 
land. House-holds not cropping own land are engaged in such activities as 
wage employment for plough cultivation, producing handicrafts, hunting and 
gathering, collecting forest resources (firewood and timber) and wage working 
in local semi-urban market places. The survey estimates that a lower 
proportion of households perceiving medium and high violence are engaged in 
cropping own land. More than one-third of the total households with 
perception of low violence (31%) are not cropping their own land. The 
proportion of ‘non-cropping’ households perceiving medium violence 
increased to 50% while the same is 47% for those household perceiving high 
violence. The variation in the proportion of household without cultivation with 
respect to variation of perceiving different levels of violence is statistically 
significant (Table 4.5). 
TABLE 4.5 
 Household involvement in agriculture by levels perceived violence  
Perceived violence level Household involvement (%) 
 Cropping own land Not cropping own land 
Low violence 69 31 
Medium violence 50 50 
High violence 53 47 
Overall 60 40 
* Pearson chi2 Pr = 0.000 (to three significant places)  
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
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Further investigation into the choice of cultivation techniques among the 
households with cropping own land revealed that the proportion of jum 
cultivation relative to the use of the plough decreases with perceptions of 
violence. The former is the more traditional farming technique, employed by 
the indigenous peoples of CHT.  The variation in use of production techniques 
in relation with different levels of perceived violence is found to be statistically 
significant (Table 4.6). Jum as a type of cultivation technique is used by 28% to 
31% of households perceiving medium and high violence, while the figure is 
52% for households perceiving low level of violence. On the other hand, 
plough cultivation is applied by 73% to 75% of households perceiving medium 
and high level of violence, whereas 67% households with low levels of threats 
employ plough cultivation as their production technique.  
It appears that the fear of violence draws indigenous households away 
from swidden (jum) cultivation to the use of the plough. This can also mean 
that they are forced to relocate in plain lands, and are compelled to intensify 
use of land as jum cultivation is more extensive in land use. Another plausible 
explanation can be increasing plough cultivation among the indigenous peoples 
may be associated with a shorter fallow period. Also declining jum cultivation 
creates pres-sure on indigenous people to use more previously uncultivated 
plains land, such as in the Kaptai valley. 
TABLE 4.6 
 Households reporting differing techniques of cultivation with respect to perceived 
violence 
Technique of cultivation (%) Perceived violence level 
Jum Plough Both 
Low violence 52.3 66.6 19.0 
Medium violence 28.4 72.6 1.0 
High violence 30.7 75.3 6.0 
Overall 31.0 56.4 12.6 
* Pearson chi2 Pr = 0.000 (to three significant places) 
**Note: The reported proportion of households using Jum and plough as technique of cultivation 
considers the ‘both’ as additive. 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
 
Results from the quantitative analysis are quite consistent with the findings 
of qualitative research. Almost all the participants in FGD are of the opinion 
that indigenous people are increasingly choosing options other than cropping 
own land as their primary occupations because of increasing scarcity of 
cultivable land. According to them, at present it is not very difficult to find an 
indigenous household not cultivating crop which would have been a rare 
phenomenon in the past. They also reported that choice of non-cultivation of 
any types of crops is not happening because of pull factors (where other 
economic activity is more profitable) rather it is a reluctant decision for them. 
They also pointed that households living in the areas more vulnerable to 
violence are trying to find different occupation other than cultivation as most 
of the violence is associated with land. Those who perceived high risk of 
violence expressed their feelings in a FGD in Rangamati district as “It is safer 
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to choose non-cultivation type of occupation for our livelihood, our children 
need to survive in the struggle against occupying population”.  
They also narrated their stories how they are more and more constrained 
to take up activities other than cultivating crops. An indigenous person 
perceiving high risk of violence during my visit in a village at Dighinala Upzilla 
of Khagrachari district expressed her pain in the following way; “We have 
already passed more than a decade after signing Shanti Chokti (peace accord), 
nothing is happened to bring the peace. Bengali speaking Settlers and army are 
still living here and creating fear for us. To earn my livelihood I have started a 
petty shop in Upzilla (sub-district) town to avoid violence. However, still I am 
afraid of safety of my shop in the town.”  
Even the few who are earning significant sums of money by engaging in 
timber or logging businesses or gaining employment in development agencies 
like NGOs may not be happy with current changes. One commented that “jum 
is not only our livelihood options but also an in-separable part of our culture. 
Alienation from land cultivation and jum in particular, is destroying our cultural 
identity”. 
 
4.4.2 Influence of perceived violence on amount of land cultivated 
Amount of agricultural land is not large compared to the total area of CHT. 
Estimation shows that only about 6% of land area is used for crop production 
(all purpose and terrace agriculture) and about 15% is used for mostly 
horticulture and on-farm forestry while rest of the land is occupied by natural 
forest, settlement and water bodies. Jum cultivation requires land to be kept 
fallow for a few years to get back the productivity of the soil for future 
cultivation. The policy and program of Forest Department also makes forest 
resource extraction difficult for the indigenous people. Due to settlement of 
non-indigenous people in this region there is tremendous pressure on land 
which has aggravated the scarcity of cultivated land (Shelley 1992, Adnan 2004, 
and Dhali 2008).  
Indigenous people’s experience of violence resulting from displacement 
and land dispossession by the State for settlement of Bengali speaking people 
from the rest of Bangladesh induces negative impact on amount of land 
cultivated by indigenous households. About 22% of indigenous households 
experienced land dispossession and internal displacement because of conflict 
with settler community and the security forces before the Peace Accord, 1997. 
Land disputes between indigenous and Bengali speaking settler community has 
been expected to be re-solved through the establishment and functioning of 
land commission which was created by the Peace Accord but still the incidents 
of land dispossession and grabbing is continuing (Adnan, 2004 and Barkat et 
al. 2009). Against this backdrop, this research explores whether decisions on 
amount of cultivated land shows an influence from different levels of 
perceived violence considering both the absolute size of the cultivated land and 
relative size of cultivated land to total amount of land. 
According to the results of descriptive statistics (Table 4.7) there is an 
increase in the absolute amount of land cultivated with the different levels of 
perceived violence. An average indigenous household cultivates 2.6 acre of 
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land while household perceiving high level of violence is cultivating more than 
3 acre of land which is 16% higher than that of average household. In 
comparison with households perceiving low and medium level of violence, a 
household with perception of high violence cultivates 14% and 7% more land 
for crop production respectively. But household perceiving medium risk level 
of violence are cultivating lesser amount of land in comparison with both 
average households and household perceiving low violence. Considering 
proportions of amount of cultivated land to total land provides an unclear 
picture. Households perceiving low violence may be cultivating slightly higher 
percentage of their total land holding (12%) land as compared to the 
households perceiving medium and high violence (about 11%). 
TABLE 4.7 
 Total amount of cultivated land in relation to perceived violence 
Perceived 
violence level 
Total amount of 
cultivated land (Acre) 
Standard 
deviation 
Proportion of amount of 
cultivated land to total land 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation 
Low violence 2.64 412 12.0 46.2 
Medium 
violence 
2.46 259 10.5 26.3 
High violence 3.03 334 10.9 41.2 
Overall 2.60 354 11.4 39.3 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
 
To get more accurate and precise estimation of influence of violence 
perception on amount of land cultivated regression technique was applied. 
Regression results (Table 4.8) for the influence of perceived violence on 
proportion of cultivated land to total land (land use) indicate that households 
(cropping own land) perceiving medium levels of violence cultivated 30% 
more land as a proportion of the total land they possess compared to 
households perceiving low levels of violence, and the result is statistically 
significant (Table 4.8). Apart from perceived violence, growing both food and 
cash crops statistically significantly raises land use by 43%. 
We obtained significant result for high level of perceived violence in case 
of regressing absolute amount of total cultivated land. Households perceiving 
high risk of violence cultivated about 19% more land compared to the amount 
of land cultivated by households perceiving low level of violence and it is 
found to be statistically significant. For households perceiving medium level 
violence cultivated about 14% more land compared to the amount of land 
cultivated by households perceiving low level risk of violence and this result is 
also statistically significant. Apart from perceived violence, growing both food 
and cash crop also raise the proportion of cultivated land to total land by 43% 
which is found to be statistically significant (Table 4.8). 
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TABLE 4.8 
 Determinants of amount of land cultivated: OLS Estimation 
Dependent variable Explanatory Variables 
Proportion of land cultivated to 
total land 
Amount of land cultivated 
HH size -0.0111 -0.0152 
 (0.0264) (0.0124) 
Age of HH head 0.000460 0.000104 
 (0.00403) (0.00207) 
Sex of HH head 0.101 0.0615 
 (0.112) (0.0554) 
Primary education of HHH -0.153 -0.0232 
 (0.131) (0.0658) 
Secondary education of HHH  0.0836 0.0249 
 (0.141) (0.0711) 
Above secondary education of HHH  0.417 0.0771 
 (0.627) (0.257) 
Cash crop -1.343*** -0.850*** 
 (0.420) (0.280) 
Both food and cash crop 0.430*** 0.549*** 
 (0.116) (0.0528) 
Jum Cultivation 0.155 0.0564 
 (0.114) (0.0649) 
Both Jum and plough cultivation 0.0536 -0.0217 
 (0.242) (0.0985) 
Perceived medium violence 0.306*** 0.136** 
 (0.115) (0.0560) 
Perceived high violence 0.0870 0.190* 
 (0.176) (0.0970) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
 
Discussion with the indigenous peoples revealed that after peace accord 
there has been an increasing tendency to use all of their resources in a way so 
that no resource is left unused. As land is the most vital livelihood resource 
they try to intensify its use. During a transect walk, this researcher observed 
that people are cultivating various types of vegetables and fruits in the small 
piece of land adjacent to their homestead (kitchen garden). People are growing 
more food than earlier as now they are also producing for market not only for 
household needs. To gain cash money through market exchange they are more 
interested to produce surplus which induces them to cultivate more land. 
During FGD in Khagrachari a traditional leader; Karbari (who is the head of a 
village) expressed his view as “still we are living in threat of violence however 
after peace accord communication facilities has been developed and mobility 
of businessman and traders has been increased. People are becoming more 
encouraged to cultivate more land to produce more. Now we can sell our 
products to the traders from our village and we are getting higher price for our 
goods than before.”  
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Previous research and discussion with the indigenous people suggests that 
because of restricted access to land due to the forest policy and settlement, 
they are reducing the duration of fallow cycle for land used for jum cultivation 
(Adnan 2004). Informal discussion suggested that the households perceiving 
higher violence are spending more time in economic activities com-pared to 
others and they are more motivated in trying to use their all sorts of resources 
(where land is the main resource) for production which can be a plausible 
reason for increased proportion of cultivated land to total amount of land. 
However, it was reported that there are some households who are traumatized 
due to fear of violence, which may retard them from engaging in production 
process.  
Development organizations working in improving livelihood of 
indigenous people have a positive role recognized by the community people. 
Indigenous people reported that NGO workers are working to make them 
more conscious and motivate them to engage more in productive work which 
resulted in more intensive cultivation of land. During my discussion with one 
NGO worker, he mentioned that their program is trying to motivate people 
who are living in high violence prone area to involve in production process 
more by using their existing resources along with some skill development 
training and access to micro-credit. 
 
4.4.3 Influence of perceived violence on type of crops produced 
It might be expected that indigenous households are very concerned about 
their food security and that is why still a significant proportion of households 
only produce food crops. Independent of perceptions of risk of violence, the 
tendency is to produce food crop first with highest priority and then go for 
cash crop either independently or along with food crop. Usually in jum 
cultivation most of the households are producing mixed crops. In Jum 
cultivation rice is grown along with local variety of oil seed, cotton, maize, 
small millets, pulses, vegetables and fruits. It was also reported that when 
mixed crops are grown in the jum plot it does not involve a large extra effort or 
cost. A few indigenous communities grow fruits like orange, mandarin and 
pineapple in the ridge-top areas, terraced hill slopes and hilltop islands dotted 
across the Kaptai Lake. Apart from jum cultivation indigenous households 
grow wet-rice, tobacco, winter vegetables, mustard, chilli and water melon in 
the plain lands of the CHT (Adnan 2004). 
Though the share of crop production in gross regional product was 
reportedly declining (16% in 1985-86 to 11% in 1997-98), but the role of crop 
production in the hill economy is still relevant because of the subsistence 
nature of the economy and inseparable place of crop production in the socio-
cultural aspect of the indigenous peoples’ life. The subsistence crop of rice is 
cultivated in both jum and plough cultivation and it is the cornerstone of their 
traditional economy. Besides rice cultivation, a number of other crops 
including various types of vegetables, oil seeds, cotton, tobacco and other cash 
crops are cultivated (Adnan 2004).  Because of subsistence nature of the 
society the dominance of producing food crop is obvious though, in the past, 
indigenous households used to produce both food and cash crop in the jum as 
the cultivation type supports mixed crop production. They also practiced 
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mixed crop production as they try to earn the highest revenue from jum field. 
Literature shows that in post-civil war period people are found more willing to 
grow cash crops which resulted in higher monetary benefits (Nillesen and 
Verwimp, 2010). In this section, the variation in type of crop produced by the 
households considering the fact of perceiving violence is analysed. For this 
analysis, households producing various types of crops are categorized into 
three different groups; only food crop, only cash crop and mixed crop. It is 
worth mentioning that data does not show at what proportions food and cash 
crop exists in the ‘mixed crop’ category. 
In the CHT, the majority of indigenous households who crop their own 
land (62%) produce mixed crops, with 36% engaged in only food crops. It has 
to be borne in mind that cash crop cultivation involves more risk of physical 
and economic loss, and we might expect more subsistence food cultivation 
following conflict, and the trauma of violence. The proportion of house-hold 
producing only cash crops is negligible (Table 4.9). Regression techniques 
using logit and probit regression were run where the endogenous variable mixed 
crop is in the form of a dummy variable (0 and 1), and the results are reported 
in Table 4.10. When we relate these figures to the subjective experience of 
violence the proportion of households producing mixed crops is 63%, 61% 
and 58% for those households perceiving high, medium and low levels of 
violence respectively. It appears that the propensity for mixed cultivation may 
rise slightly with subjective perceptions of violence (Table 4.9). Regression 
techniques using OLS, logit and probit regression were run (Table 4.10 reports 
the probit result) where the endogenous variable mixed crop is in the form of 
dummy variable (0 and 1). 
TABLE 4.9 
 Type of crops produced by households in relation to perceived violence  
Type of crop produced by households (%) Perceived violence level 
Only Food Only Cash Mixed Crop 
Low violence 40 2 58 
Medium violence 37 2 61 
High violence 35 2 63 
Overall 36.4 1.4 62.2 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
 
The estimated coefficient (at 1% level) for medium level of perceived 
violence suggests that this type of households are more likely to produce mixed 
crops by about 8% in comparison with the households perceiving low level of 
violence. Similarly, households perceiving high levels of violence are producing 
more mixed crop by 8%, compared to the households perceiving low levels of 
violence, this result is statistically significant at a 5% confidence level. The 
variables, different levels of perceived violence (both medium and high) are 
found positively related with the mixed crop production with statistical 
significance across the logit and probit regression models. Our findings are 
qualitatively similar to that of Nillesen and Verwimp (2010) for post-conflict 
rural Burundi, where the cultivation of cash crops increased. In addition to the 
variable of interest (perceived level of violence) it also found that there are 
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some other explanatory variables; age of household head, sex of household 
head, household head passed secondary education, amount of land cultivated, 
and plough cultivation  which also have significant association with the de-
pendent variable, mixed cropping. We find that greater education and age in 
the head of house-hold enhances the probability of mixed crop cultivation, 
arguably a riskier activity than food crop alone.  
Our apparently anomalous results, with respect to rising risk taking in 
cropping patterns following greater subjective feelings of violent experiences, 
can best be explained by less well known theories about risky behaviour. 
Conventional wisdom would suggest that individuals become more risk averse 
after an adverse shock, such as conflict and the fear of violence. This is also 
the prediction of expected utility theory in conjunction with the concavity 
property of standard utility functions leading to the properties of diminishing 
marginal utility of income, as well as absolute risk aversion. The standard 
precepts of expected utility do not, however, hold in many contexts. In our 
case, we can argue that both land dispossession and subjective perceptions of 
violence amount to ‘trauma’, which has a pecuniary counterpart that may be 
characterised as one where the concerned individual or household has 
sustained a large unexpected financial loss. 
TABLE 4.10 
 Determinant of production of mixed crop: regression results 
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable : Mixed Crop 
 Logit, mfx Probit, mfx 
HH size -0.00637 -0.00700 
 (0.00625) (0.00648) 
Age of HH head 0.00177* 0.00179* 
 (0.000976) (0.00100) 
Sex of HH head -0.0467* -0.0463* 
 (0.0267) (0.0273) 
Primary education of HH head 0.0153 0.0137 
 (0.0306) (0.0315) 
Secondary education of HH head 0.0733** 0.0737** 
 (0.0318) (0.0332) 
Above secondary education of HH head 0.00974 0.00255 
 (0.145) (0.146) 
Amount of land cultivated 0.000579*** 0.000517*** 
 (7.83e-05) (7.07e-05) 
Type of cultivation; Plough 0.0607** 0.0642** 
 (0.0264) (0.0270) 
Type of cultivation: jum and plough -0.0334 -0.0323 
 (0.0536) (0.0546) 
Perceived medium violence 0.0735*** 0.0782*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0269) 
Perceived High violence 0.0815** 0.0803** 
 (0.0378) (0.0402) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
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Markowitz (1952) suggested that starting from a state of loss; individuals 
are wont to engage in more risk taking to regain their previous valued position, 
than when their wealth portfolio is exhibiting positive growth (profit) and their 
expectations are over-fulfilled. Secondly, he also pointed out that what may 
matter more for decisions to engage in risky projects is the distribution of 
possible profit or loss it may entail, rather than the absolute (expected) value of 
risky prospect. In other words, the direction of change in the individual’s asset 
position and the possibility of regaining a highly valued asset in monetary or 
social terms are more salient than its level.  
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we may utilize ‘prospect’ theory 
to explain our empirical findings with regard to cropping patterns, bearing in 
mind that cash crop cultivation is more risky, as it does not guarantee the 
household’s subsistence and is more subject to market fluctuations. Prospect 
theory represents a departure from expected utility in that it is a two stage 
process, and risky ventures are weighted not just by (subjective) probability of 
the different risky states, but by a more complicated ‘decision weighting’ 
process. The first stage of the decision involves, an editing phase where a 
reference point is chosen to evaluate the likely effect of the actual risky 
investment framed in terms of specific characteristics highly valued by the 
decision maker, e.g. regaining a previous state. As has been indicated, following 
the trauma of eviction and/or violence, individuals may feel that the key value 
of assets have diminished and must be replaced as a priority. In the second 
stage of evaluation, when the household decides on its type of crop 
investments, it may take more risks, if the risky project has a high enough 
decision weight compared to the less risky alternative.  
Decision weighting is related to the probability of an uncertain project 
bearing fruition, but it also includes the subjective desirability of the outcome, 
a property that alters less readily in the mind than the pure probability of 
success. The point being that taking on more risks is understandable if there is 
a substantial chance that more risky investments will lead to recuperation of 
particular erstwhile losses. This may explain why households with a greater 
perception of violence are slightly more likely to invest in the more risky cash 
crops, as well as intensify land use in agriculture.7   
Discussion with knowledgeable indigenous community leaders on issue of 
growing more mixed crops by the people who perceive more violence 
suggested that it is not the general picture of the whole CHT. This kind of 
change may be found easily in the villages which are either close to the market 
place and urban location or have good communication facilities. However, they 
                                                 
7 Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), let the value (V) of the household’s risky 
prospect be: 
.0,)()],(1[)(),(,)];()()[,()(),,,( 21    yvLpxvLporyvxvLpyvLpyxV
Here v(x) is the value of the risky project; v(y) is the value of the less risky project; p 
refers to the probability of success of x, π is the decision weight which is a positive 
function of both the probability of success, and losses (L) previously sustained. It is 
immediately apparent that an increase in losses due to perceptions of violence will 
raise the attractiveness of the risky project by weighing the decision weight more 
heavily in favour of x. 
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also mentioned that households perceiving more violence are in general, 
greater risk takers than others and they are increasingly involving themselves in 
producing cash crop to earn more money. I had an in-depth discussion with an 
indigenous community leader during field visit and he tried to give me a 
picture why people are moving toward cash crop. He narrated his experience 
as  
we have a good amount of land to produce our food and we do it. I asked my 
other brothers to make a fruits garden in one part of the jum plot but they are not 
agree with me as they are more concern about their rice only. I try to make them 
understood that if we produce fruits in one part of our land we can earn more 
money to buy our food grains and we may have surplus to do other things. 
Finally they agreed with my argument.  
Some FGD participants pointed that after signing of peace accord 
presence of non-indigenous traders and businessman who are coming from 
outside or adjacent districts of CHT has considerably been increased. Now it 
becomes easy to sell products (with relatively higher price) - earlier the 
vegetables and fruits rotted just because of absence of traders. However, they 
also raised their voice against surplus appropriation by most of the Bengali 
speaking traders. They also expressed their concern regarding increased 
economic crime like extortion and mugging on the street at night made by 
some unidentified groups (both indigenous and settlers are accused) because of 
presence of cash money in their economy. Examples of experiences of 
extortion are also found in previous study conducted in the CHT (Barkat et al. 
2009 and Adnan 2004). 
5   Conclusion 
This research was designed to investigate household livelihood decision-
making under continuing fear of violence in an uncertain post-conflict 
situation, despite a formal Peace Accord. Households were treated as active 
rational agents who optimize their short and long term interests in a bounded 
rationality context and who achieve their intended outcomes. The aim of this 
study is intended to explore micro-level behaviour (at household level as a 
localized phenomenon) in a post-conflict scenario. Using an empirical 
livelihoods framework this paper discusses the influence of different levels of 
perceived threat of violence on three different but interlinked households’ 
livelihood decisions; consumption (both food and non-food) expenditure 
decisions, decisions on long term investment, and current production 
decisions. Consumption decision is indicated by the per capita annual cash or 
cash-equivalent consumption expenditure. Long term investment decision is 
proxied by decision to enrol children in primary and secondary schools. 
Decisions to engage in one of two forms of cultivation techniques, amount of 
land cultivated and type of crop produced are three decisions proxied to 
indicate general production decisions. 
Households’ livelihood decision-making is observed through livelihood 
outcomes assuming decision-making, influenced by differing household 
perceptions of risk of violence, has produced intended outcomes. Investigating 
the influence of perceived violence on household livelihood decision-making 
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seeks to answer the question of what types of changes are being induced in the 
post-conflict situation among the indigenous people of the CHT. It is also 
hoped the insights from CHT will have substantial methodological implication 
for researching formal post-conflict situations elsewhere. 
Construction of violence index to indicate perception of threat of violence 
proved a challenging task. Threat of violence is defined by household’s 
perception of different types of possible violence happening in post-conflict 
CHT. Analysis, informed by both quantitative and qualitative data, suggests 
that some household livelihood decision-making has been significantly 
influenced by different levels of perceived risk of violence. Findings presented 
in this paper have similarities to the models of ‘post traumatic growth theory’ 
and ‘phoenix factor’ where improved economic performance is positively 
associated with decreasing violence. However, the results shown here should 
be treated as a ‘short run’ phenomenon since according to Bate’s vision of an 
‘Inverted-U-shaped’ relationship between violence and prosperity over time in 
which the long term results of continuing growth will tend to diminish the 
threat of violence. It is important to note that the ‘phoenix factor’ economic 
improvement, though welcome, is very limited in absolute terms for the 
indigenous people of CHT.   
The nature and degree of influence of perceived risk of violence varies 
across the different livelihood decisions and across households. Cash-
equivalent consumption decisions are negatively related to perception of risk of 
violence with less consumption associated with higher violence perception. 
This negative relationship to the amount of spending on consumption 
expenditure made by the household suggests increased perceived risk of 
violence as a stimulus to save. FGD findings suggest that decision on the 
amount of consumption expenditure among the households perceiving 
different levels of violence is the outcome of a decision-making process where 
households are more interested in keeping assets in more fungible forms.  
Data on decisions to enrol or not to enrol children in school as a proxy 
for long term investment decision suggested that households perceiving higher 
threats of violence have higher school enrolment rates. Motivations for gaining 
permanent increases in human capital as a resource which is movable and 
difficult to be destroyed plus reducing the pressure on land appears to be 
functioning behind this type of investment decision. 
Under the production decision, regression results show that households 
perceiving high and medium risk level of violence are cultivating more land 
proportional to total land owned as compared to households perceiving low 
level risk of violence. This result implies that households perceiving higher 
levels of violence are making more intensive using of the land and possibly 
reducing the fallow period. Another finding is that households perceiving 
higher levels of violence are producing mixed crops (both cash and food 
crops) more frequently compared to the households perceiving low level of 
violence. Instead of producing only food crops households appear to be 
moving towards production of both cash crops and food crops with a 
motivation of gaining more cash and therefore, investing in human capital 
development for long term future gains. This indicates that a post-conflict 
‘phoenix’ factor may be in operation at the household level in which some 
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income raising livelihood decisions are made as a consequence of fear of 
renewed violence. In the short run, the factor appears to operate through both 
increased land use and cash crop cultivation and in the long run through 
increased human capital. 
Livelihood decision-making experiences influenced by different levels of 
perceived threat of violence at household level explored by this paper appear 
to be disturbingly consistent with ‘modernization’ as advocated for rural 
households in neo-liberal development strategies. Decreasing emphasis on 
present consumption, long term investment in human capital, using land more 
intensively to earn more cash and move towards creating surplus instead of 
producing for subsistence suggests perceived violence is producing decisions 
which are similar to those advocated in the ‘modernization model’.  
Overall this research provides evidence that nothing substantial has 
happened in the post-conflict CHT to reduce pressure on land as the key 
livelihood asset. Though indigenous households are trying to avoid violent 
incidents and they are moving towards non-land related livelihood options, 
settlers from outside CHT are maintaining pressure on the land. According to 
the Malthusian trap theory, increasing population (both indigenous and Bengali 
speaking settlers) and diminishing marginal productivity of land (especially in 
jum cultivation with shorter fallow periods) and absence of industrialization 
along with absence of well-defined property rights (often confined to 
usufructory rights) has crucial implications for continuing tension and 
maintaining the risk of a recurrence of ethnic conflict in the region and related 
rational fears of future violence among indigenous households in CHT. 
Moreover, data on various indicators regarding perception of violence and 
qualitative research suggest the amount of social capital between indigenous 
and the settler population has not been increasing in a positive direction which 
also creates vulnerability in terms of peace-confidence building in CHT – 
interacting greed/need and grievance processes are both still active. The role 
and function of indigenous and settler households does not appear as 
complementary to each other in the livelihood decision-making process where 
land is the key livelihoods’ resource for both groups of people. 
The findings suggest that generally there may be possible that there is a 
positive household level economic response to high fear of violence after an 
imperfect accord claiming to end a low-intensity conflict aimed at autonomy 
and not secession. This fear of violence may make some people bolder and less 
risk averse in order to enhance their long-term future in the context of 
continuing likely macro-political uncertainty with significant fear of future 
violence at the household micro level. Prospect theory may also be useful in 
understanding this reaction, as people frame their decisions in the light of 
socio-economic priorities to regain a past situation that precedes any valuation 
of the consequences of greater risk taking. But exploration of these 
behavioural economics claims must await further research. 
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Appendix A - Summary statistics and data tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean value Standard 
deviation 
Number of  
observation 
Per capita annual consumption expenditure (in Tk.) 11,838 4496 2651 
Per capita annual food consumption expenditure (in Tk.) 11,087 4309 2651 
Per capita annual non-food consumption expenditure (in Tk.) 751.0 426.1 2651 
Child enrolment in primary and secondary school 0.41 0.492 1987 
Proportion of children enrolled of total children in HH 0.72 0.384 1285 
Involvement in agriculture 0.60 0.489 1786 
Type of cultivation 
Plough cultivation 0.19 0.391 2651 
Jum cultivation 0.34 0.474 2651 
Both Jum and plough cultivation 0.08 0.265 2651 
Amount of land cultivated (Decimal) 282.24 383.96 2143 
Proportion of cultivated land of total land 11.37 39.33 2011 
Type of crops produced 
Only food 0.364 0.481 2143 
Only cash 0.014 0.119 2143 
Mixed (Both food and cash) crop 0.622 0.485 2143 
Per capita asset (in Tk.) 10,366 2575 2651 
HH electrification 0.17 0.3775 1633 
Household size 5.18 2.028 2651 
Age of household head (in years) 38.8 13.54 1629 
Sex of household head (Male=1) 0.62 0.486 1629 
HH head never attended school 0.58 0.494 1629 
HH head completed primary school 0.23 0.420 1629 
HH head completed secondary School 0.18 0.388 1629 
HH head completed above secondary School 0.01 0.091 1629 
Age of child (in year) 7.13 4.758 1987 
Age square of child 73.5 83.67 1987 
Sex of child (Male=1) 0.64 0.481 1987 
Type of School studied 
Government school  0.57 0.493 1987 
NGO school 0.29 0.455 1987 
Private school 0.09 0.298 1987 
Other type of school 0.03 0.165 1987 
Language of book (Mother tongue) 0.21 0.410 1633 
Medium of instruction (Mother tongue) 0.22 0.412 1633 
Perception of violence 1.52 0.628 2651 
Low level of perceived violence 0.55 0.497 2651 
Medium level of perceived violence 0.38 0.485 2651 
High level of perceived violence 0.07 0.254 2651 
Experience of violence before peace accord 
Displacement 0.13 0.338 2651 
Land dispossession 0.19 0.392 2651 
Armed conflict 0.19 0.393 2651 
Casualty 0.05 0.2188 1786 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009
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Table 2: Household reported perception of threat of violence by indicators 
Level of perceived threat of violence (%) Violence variable 
Low (1) Medium (2) High (3) 
Abduction 90.3 8.9 0.9 
Extortion 69.9 26.9 3.2 
Armed conflict 80.2 15.8 4.0 
Communal threat 59.8 27.6 12.7 
Restricted movement 62.9 23.4 13.7 
Insecurity of women 64.7 21.4 13.9 
Insecurity of children 13.9 20.8 10.7 
Trust on other community 55.7 25.3 19.0 
Eviction from land 49.8 19.0 31.2 
Repression of Security force 37.5 45.2 17.3 
Safety and security feelings 37.5 60.0 2.5 
Cultural freedom 46.5 51.5 98.0 
Customary right 47.3 50.3 2.4 
N=1786 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
Table 3: Household experience of violence by types before peace accord 
Type of violence Household (%) 
Forced migration  13.2 
Land dispossession  19.0 
Armed conflict  19.2 
N= 1786 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
Table 4: Level of perceived threat of violence reported by household  
Level of violence Household (%) 
Low level of perceived threat of violence 55 
Medium  level of perceived threat of violence 36 
High level of perceived threat of violence 9 
N=1786              Chi-square Pr=0.000  
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009 
Table 5: Determinants of Consumption Expenditure: OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable Explanatory Variables 
All Consumption 
Expenditure 
Food Consumption 
Expenditure 
Non-food Consumption 
Expenditure 
HH size -0.0489*** -0.0501*** -0.0978*** 
 (0.00472) (0.00440) (0.00622) 
Age of HH head -0.00100 -0.00118* 0.00122 
 (0.000695) (0.000661) (0.000917) 
Sex of HH head 0.0507*** 0.0283 0.0610** 
 (0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0248) 
HH head completed pri-
mary school 
0.00550 0.0211 0.00503 
 (0.0220) (0.0209) (0.0290) 
HH head completed sec-
ondary School 
0.0317 0.0346 -0.0147 
 (0.0241) (0.0232) (0.0319) 
HH head completed above 
secondary School 
-0.0613 -0.0619 0.241 
 (0.111) (0.0942) (0.147) 
HH electrification 0.0190 0.0142 0.0429 
 (0.0240) (0.0222) (0.0316) 
Per capita HH asset 1.52e-06*** 1.87e-06*** 2.16e-06*** 
 (3.35e-07) (3.49e-07) (4.42e-07) 
Proportion of enrolled 
children 
-0.0573** - -0.0471 
 (0.0236) - (0.0312) 
Violence perception -0.0468*** -0.0409*** -0.0917*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0175) 
Constant 9.662*** 9.564*** 7.065*** 
 (0.0473) (0.0420) (0.0624) 
Observations 1,285 1,629 1,285 
R-squared 0.118 0.106 0.207 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s estimation based on the data collected by Barkat et al. 2009
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Appendix B - Data source and tools of  data collection 
 
Matrix 1: Recoding of response on violence indicators for construction of Violence Index 
 
Variable name  The original question/format of data collection Adjustment to get new variable  
Current status of obstacles to  peace 
Abduction No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Extortion  No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Armed conflict  No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Communal Threat  No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Restricted move-
ment                          
No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Insecurity of 
women  
No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Insecurity of chil-
dren  
No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Trust on other 
communities              
No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Eviction from land No response= 99,  Low =1, Medium =2, High =3 No response and Low =1, Medium=2 and 
High =3 
Elements of confidence-building 
Repression of 
security forces 
 
Friendly and proactive=1, Friendly=2, Moderately friend-
ly = 3, Some how friendly = 4, Not at all friendly = 5 
(Friendly and proactive=1, Friend-
ly=2)=Low=1, (Moderately friendly = 3) = 0 
and Some how friendly = 4)= Medium=2, and 
(Not at all friendly = 5)= High=3 
Safety and security 
feelings 
Highly secured=1, Secured=2,  
Moderately secured= 3,  Some how secured= 4,  
Not at all secured = 5 
(Highly secured=1, Secured=2)=Low=1, 
Moderately secured= 3)=0 and             (Some 
how secured= 4)=Medium=2, and (Not at all 
secured = 5)= High=3 
Cultural freedom Highly secured=1, Secured=2,  
Moderately secured= 3, Some how secured= 4,  
Not at all secured = 5 
(Highly secured=1, Secured=2)=Low=1, 
Moderately secured= 3)=0 and             (Some 
how secured= 4)=Medium=2, and (Not at all 
secured = 5)= High=3 
Customary right Highly secured=1, Secured=2,  
Moderately secured= 3, Some how secured= 4,  
Not at all secured = 5 
(Highly secured=1, Secured=2)=Low=1, 
Moderately secured= 3)=0 and             (Some 
how secured= 4)=Medium=2, and (Not at all 
secured = 5)= High=3 
Experience of violence before peace accord 
Migration  Did anybody/somebody from your household migrate 
out of the Para before signing the peace treaty?   
Yes = 1  No = 2  
If yes, Reasons of migration out: 
Lack of security =2, Evicted from land =3, Communal 
conflict =4, Political conflict =5, Government pol-
icy/program =10   
 If YES and due to these reasons then 1 and 
otherwise 0 
 
Yes = 1  No = 0  
 
Land disposses-
sion 
 
Did you/ your father/ grand father ever dispossessed of 
any land, which belonged to you as agricultural land/ 
land under possession /homestead (i.e, whether your 
land was engulfed by anyone)? Yes = 1,  No = 2  
 
Yes = 1  No = 0  
 
Armed conflict  Whether any member of your household experienced 
armed violence before CHT treaty? No=1, Self=2, other 
household member=3, Self and household member=4  
(Self=2, other household member=3, Self and 
household member=4) = Yes=1, No=0 
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Data Collection Tools: FGD Session 
 
International Institute of Social Studies (IISS) 
Erasmus University of Rotterdam 
The Hague, Netherlands 
 
 
A Study 
 on 
Incorporating Perceptions and Experiences of Violence into Livelihoods 
Decision-Making: 
A Micro Level Study in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh 
 
 
Guide Line for FGD Session 
 
Ice-Breaking: introduce your self and greets the participants. Discuss the 
objective of discussion and confidentiality of information to be provided by 
them. Show few pictures of my previous visit in this region and interaction 
with the people. Before starting of discussion keep permission of recording. 
 
Address of the place where FGD session held 
 
Date of FGD session 
 
List of participants 
 
Issues for Discussion 
 
Step - 1: A comparative picture of change in livelihood after signing of the 
 Peace Accord 
 
Step - 2: Important factors functioning in livelihood decision-making  
 process 
 
Step - 3: Current status of threat of different types of violence  
 
Step - 4: Role of threat of violence in livelihood decision-making 
 
 
Please acknowledge the participation and cooperation extended by them and 
invite them for food and drinks. 
